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 1 Introduction 
  1.1 Aim and Research Questions 
When Georgia launched a military operation against South Ossetia on the night of 7 to 8 
August 2008, President George W. Bush was following the Olympic Games in China 
along  with  the  rest  of  the  world.  The  U.S.  Congress  was  at  recess,  and  even  the  
presidential campaigns of Senators Barack Obama and John McCain were taking it 
slowly before the home stretch: Obama’s first statements on the conflict were delivered 
from a holiday resort in Hawaii. The Russia-Georgia war caught the United States off 
guard. 
In the foreign policy circles, an intense debate erupted on the reasons for, consequences 
of and the administration’s response to the conflict. Reading the newspapers, watching 
the television and following the discussion in the think tank community, it is possible to 
recognize a myriad of different stories that were told about the crisis in the Caucasus. 
Another thing that stands out is how the Russia-Georgia war was immediately perceived 
by many as a significant shift in world politics. Finnish Foreign Minister Alexander 
Stubb (2008) was not alone in his judgment that the little war had “changed the world”. 
More than two years later, when many of the details about the crisis remain unclear, it is 
still commonly assumed that the war was not only a regional conflict that could be 
explained by historical and sociological factors, but symbolic of something more 
important: a sign of times to come. In Washington D.C., the discussion that followed the 
war was rapidly transformed into a battle over the direction of the U.S. foreign policy 
after the presidency of George W. Bush. Like all significant political developments in 
2008, the conflict also became an issue in the presidential election. 
The stories about the Russia-Georgia war were thus politically charged. How the 
context was framed and the conflict interpreted had direct policy consequences. The 
discussion was closely intertwined with several fundamental questions about the U.S. 
foreign policy: What was the global role of the United States after the unilateral moment 
and  in  the  face  of  a  number  of  rising  great  powers,  a  group in  which  Russia  appeared  
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eager to assert its membership? Should Washington wield a carrot or a stick in dealing 
with adversaries? Did the crisis provide evidence for or against further expanding the 
NATO to Georgia and Ukraine? Among other places, inspiration was looked for in 
history books and theoretical  assumptions that were seen to have served the West well  
during the Cold War. 
The initial empirical motivation for the present thesis was to shed light on the 
contentious and confusing foreign policy discussion that followed the Russia-Georgia 
war. It was assumed that an analysis of the discursive battle would provide interesting 
insights on the U.S. security and defense policy at the outset of the Obama 
administration. Many themes that were sounded during the discussion – for example the 
need to maintain deterrence and credibility vs. engaging the rivals, unilateralism vs. 
multilateralism – hold obvious importance for the way the United States approaches 
other contemporary security issues such as the NATO enlargement, missile shield, Iran, 
or terrorism. 
At a theoretical level, the securitization framework established by the Copenhagen 
School has proved useful in identifying and disentangling complex discourses on 
security. Following Buzan and Wæver (2003, 491), securitization is defined as 
[A] discursive process through which an intersubjective understanding is constructed within a 
political community to treat something as an existential threat to a valued referent object, and to 
enable a call for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with that threat. 
Security is thus treated as a practice, a specific way to frame an issue (Wæver 1998, 80). 
This thesis applies the securitization theory to the U.S. foreign policy discussion that 
was going on in the fall of 2008. Accordingly, attempts to define the conflict are 
understood as “speech acts” which name previously undefined issues as security 
matters. Based on the source material, the discussion is analyzed in order to find out 
what exactly was perceived to be at stake, how the competing explanations for the 
conflict were formed, what interests they served and who were the actors behind these 
explanations. Addressing these questions reveals how the boundaries of the security 
discourse are controlled by excluding too controversial interpretations of the conflict, 
which works to reproduce the prevailing hierarchical conditions. 
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To answer the research questions, this thesis applies a framework proposed by Holger 
Stritzel (2007). Drawing on the notions of embeddedness and performativity, he 
identifies  a  tension  between  a  constructivist  (“externalist”)  and  a  more  postmodern  
(“internalist”) securitization theory. Stritzel sides with the former and suggests that 
speech acts, or “threat texts” as he prefers to call them, are analyzed based on the 
existing discursive context, the performative force of the threat texts and the positional 
power of the actors presenting them. Focusing on the Russia-Georgia war, this thesis 
therefore also functions as an empirical test for Stritzel who aims at providing a firmer 
foundation for future research in the studies of securitization (2007, 358). 
However, the securitization theory has been criticized for confusing the relation of the 
speech act and its context (the “facilitating conditions”), as well as for being too focused 
on  the  moment  of  the  speech  act.  Furthermore,  it  has  not  been  able  to  explain  in  a  
satisfactory manner why and how particular speech acts, threat texts or actors are 
empowered while others are marginalized (for a discussion on the shortcomings of the 
securitization theory, see e.g. McDonald 2008). Based on a theoretical separation 
between the externalists and internalists, Stritzel’s framework attempts to address these 
issues. Nevertheless, this thesis argues that even though Stritzel provides important 
insights  to  the  problematic  aspects  of  the  securitization  theory,  he  is  unable  to  escape  
some of its main deficiencies. 
As a potential way ahead, the present thesis proposes drawing on the notion of 
narrativity, a widely studied approach in various fields of inquiry – such as literary 
theory, historiography, psychology, linguistics and anthropology (Bruner 1991) – but 
one that has not received particular attention in World Politics so far. It is argued that 
examining the processes through which the threat texts are established as narratives 
sheds light on their unstated assumptions and underlying motives, as well as on the 
logic of exclusion and inclusion inherent in the discursive competition. It is not within 
the reach of a Master’s Thesis to develop a coherent theory of narrativity in World 
Politics; rather, the theoretical aim is to use the empirical discussion about the Russia-
Georgia war to show how a focus on narrativity could both complement the 
securitization theory and take it further. 
In order to merge the empirical and theoretical aims of the research, this thesis examines 
the formation and content of one foreign policy narrative. Stritzel’s framework 
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presupposes a strong focus on actors presenting the threat texts, and it seems feasible to 
assume that narratives have narrators. Accordingly, it is argued that the discussion that 
followed the Russia-Georgia war cannot be understood without paying attention to U.S. 
neoconservatism. Hence the suggestion of the term “neoconservative narrative” which 
will  be  elaborated  in  chapter  1.3.  Throughout  the  thesis,  empirical  analysis  of  this  
neoconservative narrative will shed light on the more theoretical aspects of narrativity, 
and vice versa. 
After the introduction, chapter two presents the concept of narrativity and its recent 
applications in World Politics. The securitization framework of Holger Stritzel (2007) is 
then proposed as a theoretical tool for analyzing the neoconservative narrative on the 
Russia-Georgia war. After a discussion on how to identify narratives underlying in 
empirical material, the chapter presents the material used in this thesis, most 
importantly two seminars organized by the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) and the 
Brookings Institution on 13 and 14 August 2008 in Washington, D.C. 
The  three  main  chapters  of  this  thesis  draw  on  the  three  dimensions  of  Stritzel’s  
framework: the context of the threat texts in the existing discourse (chapter three), the 
positional power of the actors presenting the texts (chapter four), and the performative 
force of the texts (chapter five). While all of the chapters are thus based on an element 
of Stritzel’s framework, they follow his own advice for the empirical studies “to work 
out in detail which element of the framework is, when and why, most important” 
(Stritzel 2007, 358). Accordingly, in addition to analyzing the discursive context for the 
neoconservative threat texts, chapter three also examines the logic through which threat 
texts are established as narratives. Chapter four discusses not only the positional power 
of neoconservatives in August 2008 but also alternative threat texts presented by other 
actors. Before the conclusions, chapter five argues that there remains a tension between 
the internalists and externalists within Stritzel’s framework. Drawing on both 
approaches, the performative force of the neoconservative narrative is shown to be 
rooted in its capacity to cite prior practices through “shortcuts to rationality”, such as 
the use of powerful historical analogies and theoretical presuppositions. 
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 1.2 The Russia-Georgia War 
The “frozen conflicts” of Abkhazia and South Ossetia date back to wars in the 
beginning of the 1990s, after which the status of these two regions bordering Georgia 
and Russia remained contested. De jure they  were  part  of  Georgia  as  autonomous  
republics: de facto only certain areas were controlled by Georgia. The ceasefire 
agreements of 1992 and 1994 were monitored by UN, OSCE and CIS. Georgia 
considered the presence of Russian peacekeepers a breach of its sovereignty, whereas 
Russia was actively issuing passports to citizens of the runaway regions. 
After increasing tensions during the spring and the early summer of 2008, the events 
escalated into a conflict when Georgian soldiers advanced to South Ossetia on 7 August. 
President Mikheil Saakashvili described the move as self-defense, but Russia retaliated 
by deploying troops to South Ossetia and conducting bombing raids into Georgia 
proper. The battle went on for five days before the Georgians were defeated and Russia 
occupied the city of Gori, an important regional center. Altogether 850 persons were 
killed and more than 100 000 civilians forced to leave their homes. A preliminary 
ceasefire agreement, negotiated by the French EU presidency, was reached on 12 
August and signed by the warring parties a few days later. As of September 2010, 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia have been recognized as independent states by Russia, 
Nicaragua, Venezuela and Nauru. 
The outbreak of hostilities may have caught the United States by surprise, but behind 
the scenes there had been a growing concern about the frozen conflicts at least since 
May 2008. During the spring, officials and experts dealing with the region had started to 
ask whether the escalation of Russian rhetoric toward Georgia should be taken 
seriously. Looming problems in the Caucasus meant difficult times also for the Bush 
administration since, as Asmus (2010, 150) points out, “Georgia’s attempts to go West 
were widely considered – rightly or wrongly – an American project with which 
President Bush was directly and personally associated”. In a speech given in Tbilisi on 
10 May 2005, Bush had praised Georgia as “a beacon of liberty” for the region and the 
world,  and  in  the  00s  the  country  became  one  of  the  most  important  recipients  of  the  
U.S. aid on a per capita basis (Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the 
Conflict in Georgia 2009 Vol. I, 15). President Saakashvili had powerful friends across 
party lines: in 2005, Senators John McCain and Hillary Clinton had jointly proposed to 
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award him the Nobel Peace Prize (Asmus 2010, 58). 
In addition to becoming an election theme – the Republican pundits challenged 
Obama’s foreign policy credentials while Democrats attempted to make an issue out of 
the McCain campaign’s ties to Georgia – the conflict also incited a conversation on the 
shape of the U.S.-Russian relations. On the one hand, the years preceding the crisis had 
witnessed a growing cooperation in matters such as counter-terrorism. One the other 
hand, U.S. plans for a Europe-based missile system were a constant source of tension, 
and Washington’s strong support for the independence of Kosovo in February 2008 was 
still prickling Russia. Moscow was also growing more and more irritated over the U.S. 
support to Ukraine and Georgia, both former Soviet republics that had gone through 
color revolutions in 2003 and 2004. In the face of fierce opposition from Russia and 
significant skepticism in some of the leading EU nations, the NATO April 2008 summit 
in Bucharest, where Georgia and Ukraine had hoped to be granted a NATO Membership 
Action  Plan  (MAP),  had  ended  with  a  confusing  compromise  solution  where  even  the  
participants were uncertain about the decisions they had taken.1 
One factor contributing to the growing anxiety in the USA was how the Bush 
administration had conveyed the U.S.-Russia relations being based on a strong personal 
relationship between the leaders. Bush had famously seen the soul in Putin’s eyes,2 but 
since then the Russian leader had been asserting himself more strongly. Nobody was 
sure about what to make of the new president, Dmitri Medvedev, and which of the two 
was calling the shots. During the August conflict the stakes were raised even higher by 
the fact that there were reportedly more than a hundred U.S. military advisers in the 
Georgian  armed  forces  when  the  hostilities  began  (Independent International Fact-
Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia 2009, 15). 
                                               
1  Asmus (2010, 134) quotes Gordon Brown’s half-joking words to George W. Bush after the presidents 
of pro-MAP Poland, Romania and Lithuania had brokered a deal with German chancellor Angela 
Merkel, the leading skeptic: “I am not sure what we did here. I know we did not extend MAP. But I’m 
not sure we didn’t just make them members of NATO”. 
2  After his first meeting with Putin in June 2001 Bush told that he had been able to “get a sense of his 
soul”. During the presidential campaign, Hillary Clinton responded by stating that “[Putin] was a 
KGB agent. By definition he doesn’t have a soul” (Smith 2008), and John McCain joked several times 
that he only saw three letters in Putin’s eyes: KGB. 
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  1.3 The Neoconservative Narrative 
The term “neoconservative narrative” is contentious in many ways. There is no common 
understanding about what constitutes neoconservatism, who are neoconservatives and 
what is their relevance in the contemporary foreign policy circles. While some argue 
that  no  group  has  had  a  greater  impact  on  U.S.  politics  over  the  last  four  decades  
(Gewen 2010), others think that neoconservatism no longer exists (Dionne 2010). 
Nevertheless,  this  thesis  suggests  that  immediately  after  the  beginning  of  the  Russia-
Georgia war, an interpretation marked by an interventionist approach to the U.S. foreign 
policy started to develop. It took the form of a story that stressed the importance of 
aggressively dealing with challenges to the U.S. interests abroad. 
Based on the source material, neoconservatives were generally seen as playing a visible 
role in the debate over the events in the Caucasus. They were constantly referred to by 
various experts, pundits and policy advocates. Keith Olbermann, the liberal-leaning host 
of an MSNBC talk show, commented (2008) on what he saw as “troubling neocon 
echoes” in John McCain, vice president Dick Cheney and “fellow neocon” William 
Kristol’s statements on Georgia (see also Brooks 2008b). Some went even further to 
speculate whether the entire war was a neoconservative election ploy (Sheer 2008)3. It 
is not possible to go into details of the complex history of the U.S. neoconservatism, but 
a short account is necessary to explain why this school of thought is central for the 
analysis of the U.S. foreign policy discussion that followed the Russia-Georgia war. 
Neoconservatism has inspired plenty of academic research. Especially the alleged 
importance of neoconservative influences within the George W. Bush administration has 
given birth to several studies of this movement, some of them flirting with conspiracy 
theories.4 John Ehrman (1995), Jacob Heilbrunn (2004) and Justin Vaïsse (2010) all 
paint a picture of a loose school of thought, intellectual outlook, tendency or persuasion 
(Vaïsse 2010, 4), that has traveled a long journey from the 1960s to the 2000s, from the 
political left to the right, opposing communism on the route. 
                                               
3 Sheer is referring to the role of Randy Scheunemann, a prominent neoconservative, who acted as a 
foreign policy adviser to the McCain campaign and had close ties to Georgia’s political leadership. 
After the outbreak of the Russia-Georgia war, Scheunemann’s connections were closely scrutinized by 
the liberal media (see for example Brooks 2008). 
4 See for example Eisendrath and Goodman 2004. The relationship between Bush and neoconservatives 
is discussed in more detail in chapter 4.2. 
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According to John Ehrman (1995, 45), neoconservative is “a term coined by Michael 
Harrington  to  describe  right-wing  socialists,  but  now  meaning  one  who  had  been  a  
liberal but had since moved to the right”. Since its conception as a part of the anti-
communist tradition of U.S. liberalism, neoconservatism has been eluding easy 
definitions. There have been neoconservatives in both parties and many administrations: 
some have opposed presidents that others have defended, some have embraced social 
liberalism or government intervention in economic affairs while others have been social 
and cultural conservatives. When it comes to foreign policy, most neoconservatives 
have favored aggressive interventionism, but there have been exceptions even in this 
regard (ibid., vii-viii). 
Indeed, like Vaïsse (2010, 3-4), one might well ask whether the term neoconservatism is 
a misleading shorthand or if neoconservatism exists at all. Fittingly, Irving Kristol – 
who is considered by many as the godfather of the neoconservative movement – has 
questioned its existence due to the lack of shared goals, ideology and organization 
(Ehrman 1995, 46). Even if one acknowledges neoconservatism as a historical 
movement, there has been much speculation about its merger to the conservative 
mainstream after the end of the Cold War (Lindberg 2004, 129). To quote Max Boot 
(2002), who himself features in the indexes of neoconservative thinkers (cf. Vaïsse 
2010, 285-287): 
But what the heck is a neocon anyway in 2003? A friend of mine suggests it means the kind of 
right-winger a liberal wouldn’t be embarrassed to have over for cocktails.  
Since its emergence in the 1960s5, neoconservatism has undergone a transformation that 
renders it almost unrecognizable, moving from the left to the right and shifting focus 
from domestic politics to foreign affairs (Vaïsse 2010, 4). However, throughout the 
history of the movement it has been united by a number of things. First and foremost is 
a strong intellectual self-understanding: neoconservatives have been depicted as 
“activist intellectuals” (Ehrman 1995, vii), “intellectual policymakers” (Farber 2010, 
246) or, later, forming “the intellectual brain trust for the GOP” (Heilbrunn 2004, 108). 
Second, neoconservatism has been defined by a staunch anticommunism: the foreign 
                                               
5 Heilbrunn (2004, 111), who is criticized by Vaïsse (2010, 5) of attributing an artificial coherence to the 
movement while neglecting its diverse sources as well as the deep divergences among members of the 
group, dates neoconservatism all the way back to the 1930s. 
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policy recipe of the movement after the World War II was “to confront the Soviet Union 
whenever and wherever possible” (Heilbrunn 2004, 109-111). It is thus not surprising 
that especially at the seminar organized by the American Enterprise Institute on 12 
August 2008, panelists still drew analogies between “Putin’s Russia” and the Soviet 
Union (cf.  F. Kagan 2008, Peters 2008). Third, as Vaïsse (2010, 2) points out, 
neoconservatives are strict universalists and in this regard the polar opposite of the 
foreign policy realism and Kissingerian realpolitik. Finally, the movement has had a 
Jewish undercurrent since its beginning, and also today the neoconservatives are strong 
defenders of Israel (ibid., 10). 
In Vaïsse’s genealogy (2010, 6-13), there are three ages of neoconservatism. The school 
of thought was conceived as a negative reaction to a leftward trend in U.S. liberalism in 
the  1960s  and,  at  the  time,  held  almost  nothing  in  common  with  the  conservative  
movement. The second family of neoconservatives in the 1970s defined itself as 
guardians of the “vital centre”, in favor of social progress at home and anticommunism 
abroad. Targeting the détente politics of Nixon and Kissinger, this group of academics 
and policymakers also became isolated inside its own party as the Democrats continued 
to move left during the Nixon presidency.  Those who turned away from the “excesses 
of radicalism” gradually became known as “new conservatives” and, by 1975, 
“neoconservatives” (Ehrman 1995, 33-34). 
Consequently, as a political movement neoconservatism broke with liberalism and the 
Democratic party amidst the radicalism of 1960s and 1970s. Many neoconservatives 
found home in Ronald Reagan’s conservative coalition, where they regained political 
influence. During the 1992 campaign, Bill Clinton made serious efforts to win 
neoconservatives back for the Democrats: some returned and many did not. However, 
most neoconservatives became quickly disillusioned with Clinton’s actions abroad 
before finding some common ground in the way the president handled Serbia, Sudan 
and Afghanistan. The neoconservatives who have stayed with the Republicans have 
always been careful to distance themselves from traditional southern and mid-western 
conservatism, sometimes referred to as paleoconservatism (Ehrman; vii-viii, 185-187). 
This divide existed already in the 1980s and became more visible with the presidential 
candidacies of Pat Buchanan who openly sided with the traditionalists. 
The neoconservatives of the third age, dubbed “neocons”, “national greatness 
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conservatives” and “conservatives who were born conservatives” by Vaïsse (2010; 11-
13, 286-287), completed the ideological migration and now occupy the conservative 
mainstream. As always in politics, interests and identities remain in flux: when it comes 
to domestic policy matters, neoconservative are often less skeptical of big government, 
less enthusiastic about tax cuts and more liberal about social politics (Lowry 2004). 
Ultimately, however, to its critics and champions alike, the third age neoconservatism is 
first and foremost a foreign policy movement (Boot 2002). 
Since the high point of the neoconservative transition coincided with the collapse of the 
Soviet Union (Ehrman 1995, 185), it was commonly debated whether the 
neoconservatives were needed anymore. Indeed, the end of the Cold War appeared a 
brilliant victory for neoconservatives. It was no coincidence that Francis Fukuyama’s 
The End of History was published in 1989 by The National Interest, a neoconservative 
magazine founded by Irving Kristol. Nevertheless, as Tod Lindberg (2004, 129) points 
out, 20 years later at least the term neoconservatism remains very much alive. 
It is also clear that the neoconservative influences in the U.S. foreign policy discussion 
did not fade with the presidency of George W. Bush. The continued relevance of 
neoconservatism was evidenced by the presidential campaigns of 2008. In addition to 
John McCain’s ties to prominent neoconservatives, in the NBC’s Countdown with Keith 
Olbermann on 11 August 2008, former senior director of the National Security Council 
Flynt Leverett reminded the audience of “a very powerful group of, what I would call, 
neo-conservative fellow travelers in the Democratic party” and confided that the Obama 
campaign is now “trying to figure out how to take some of these people in”. While the 
neoconservatives have mainly remained in the opposition during the first two years of 
the Obama presidency, their capability to influence the public discussion remains 
strong. For example, the Republican Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has told that, 
being initially skeptic towards sending more troops to Afghanistan, he changed his mind 
after reading an article by Frederick Kagan in the neoconservative The Weekly Standard 
(Kaplan 2010). 
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 2 Theory and Methodology 
The defining feature of the discussion about the Russia-Georgia war in the U.S. foreign 
policy circles is the abundance of interpretations on what actually happened and why. 
While this certainly holds true to most modern-day conflicts, it is noteworthy that both 
contemporary commentators and later analysts have pointed out the sheer amount of 
different  stories.  Olcott  (2008a)  found  it  “amazing  how  many  different  versions  of  
history are circling around the current conflict between Russia and Georgia”, taking it 
for granted that “[e]ach narrative, of course, speaks to the national concerns of the 
author or statesman offering the statement”. Asmus (2010, 176) refers to the 
phenomenon as “competing narratives or explanations … among key policymakers over 
what and who was to blame and how far the Russians might go”. 
The following chapter presents the theoretical tools for analyzing this discussion. The 
notion of narrativity is proposed as a potentially fruitful complement to the theory of 
securitization and especially Holger Stritzel’s (2007) framework that focuses on the 
formulation of “threat texts” and their embeddedness in the existing discourse, as well 
as on the positional power of the actors presenting the texts and the performative force 
of these texts. 
 2.1 Narratives in World Politics 
The notion of narrativity has been drawn upon by various approaches to World Politics 
that have been interested in identity formation, textuality, and performativity. It is often 
linked to social constructivism – in Emanuel Adler’s (1997, 337) delineation, one of the 
main currents of constructivism is defined by an emphasis on narrative knowing – but 
has been widely exploited within postmodern, postsructuralist or “intertextual” 
frameworks as well (cf. Der Derian 1989, Ashley 1998, Campbell 1998, Mottier 2005 
etc.). Critical realists such as Patomäki (2000, 592) have also argued for the importance 
of studying narrative structures in analyzing historical episodes and tendencies. 
For postmodernists and poststructuralists, the interest in narrativity has stemmed from a 
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mistrust in a “logocentric” attitude to history which, according to Ashley (1998), has 
dominated much of Western philosophy in recent centuries. Ashley argues (263) that the 
modern discourse is inclined to read history as a monologue and, in the process, to 
impose a narrative structure upon it. Similarly, Campbell (1998, 4) has opposed 
“narrativizing historiography” and promoted a “mode of historical representation that 
self-consciously adopts a perspective”. By questioning the hegemonic explanations and 
interpretations of historical and current events, these studies have aimed at contributing 
to the “proliferation of perspectives, dimensions, and approaches to the very real 
dilemmas of global life” (Campbell 1998, 4-5). As James Der Derian (1989, 6) puts it: 
[B]y generating new interpretations of the world-text, by calling into question the historically 
determined constructions through which we apprehend it, we might add new dimensions and 
alternatives to traditional international theory. 
For some postmodernist writers, the interest in narrativity has meant an explicit 
rejection of “epistemic realism” as the source of a relativizing historiography where 
things have a self-evident quality that allows them to speak for themselves. Narrativity 
is thus primarily discussed as an object of criticism, and self-consciously adopted 
perspectives are presented as the antidote against it (cf. Campbell 1998, 3-4). 
Postmodernist and poststructuralist scholars often write about narratives in a rather 
critical tone as ahistoric, simplifying discourses that strive for hegemony and act to 
stifle the dissenting voices and viewpoints (see e.g. Ashley 1989). 
Constructivist writers, on the other hand, seem to be more interested in narrativity as a 
process of intersubjective identity-formation. In a recent example, Christopher 
Browning draws up a narrative theory of identity and action which “seeks to show how 
action becomes meaningful in the process of narrating constitutive stories of the self”. 
He illustrates (2008; 11, 45, 63) how the options available for foreign policy action and 
orientation have emerged in the processes constructing the Finnish national identity. 
Critical realism obviously does not accept the postmodern critique of epistemic realism. 
Accordingly, its take on narrativity is also slightly different. For example, Patomäki 
(2002, 59) follows Ricoeur in asserting that narratives only have full meaning when 
they are restored back to the time of action and human practices, a process that Ricoeur 
calls “mimesis3”. It is important to reach out from the texts and relate them to the world 
around us: the practical question is how plausible and purportedly truer the new 
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explanatory story is when compared to the old one(s) (Patomäki 2003, 141). 
Different readings of the concept of narrative naturally lead to different definitions. At 
the most basic level, narratives can be understood as stories that give meaning to things 
and events. Narratives usually have a time dimension – a beginning, a middle and an 
end – and they presume a certain internal logic when it comes to actorship, motives and 
relations between the actors (Jokinen et al. 1999, 68; Mottier 2005). According to 
Mottier (2005, 260), this is made possible by “and, and, and” connections between 
actions and events. In most narratives it is also possible to identify act, scene, agent, 
agency and purpose. 
Postmodern, postructuralist or intertextualist definitions of narrative tend to pay 
attention  to  the  way  narratives  as  stories  are  used  to  simplify  and  create  order  out  of  
chaos. Ashley (1989, 263) argues that 
A narrative is a representation that arrests ambiguity and controls the proliferation of meaning by 
imposing a standard and standpoint of interpretation that is taken to be fixed and independent of 
the time it represents. 
According to Ashley, narratives typically privilege the least complex and least 
ambiguous elements of the text they interpret. When textual elements are encapsulated 
into a story “not in their historicity, but as the fixed, identical, and self-sufficient origins 
of  meaning”,  the  conditions  they  refer  to  are  objectified  as  “necessary”  and  
“fundamental” (ibid.). 
As Mottier (2005, 259) points out, some definitions of narrative suggest no difference 
between narrative and discourse. Mottier herself (2005, 259) understands narratives as 
possible forms of discourses, while discourses include but are not reduced to narratives. 
In the same vein, Hajer (2005, 300) examines narratives, metaphors and story lines as 
three concepts that help illuminate distinct features of discourse.6 
In this thesis, the U.S. foreign policy discussion that followed the Russia-Georgia war is 
understood as a process of intersubjective construction of meanings, interests and 
identities that both reflect the existing discourse and work to shape it. Narratives are 
                                               
6 Since Hajer is mainly interested in how narratives relate to each other and how they are shared 
between different groups of people, he focuses on the concept of story line which he defines as “a 
condensed statement summarizing complex narratives, used by people as ‘short hand’ in discussions” 
(2005, 302). 
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defined as stories that, by arranging seemingly isolated pieces of information into 
patterns that imply intentionality and rationality, simplify complex developments and 
privilege certain interpretations over others. 
Bruner (1991, 4) maintains that narratives are “necessarily normative” and describes 
them as  
[A] version of reality whose acceptability is governed by convention and “narrative necessity” 
rather than by empirical verification and logical requiredness. 
Nevertheless, this should not mean that some arguments and interpretations that make 
up a narrative cannot be judged more plausible than others. As Becker points out (1997, 
18), we do not accept stories that are not borne out by the facts available. The focus of 
the thesis is, however, more on the processes through which this plausibility is brought 
about. 
 2.2 Narratives, Performativity and Securitization 
Definitions of narratives clearly lead to the conclusion that one should not be content 
with simply asking what narratives are and what kind of phenomena they describe, but 
also what they do. Mottier (2005, 260) points out that narratives do not simply express 
pre-given identities but function as “performatives: speech acts which bring into being 
that which they name” (emphasis in the original). The focus on performativity of speech 
acts is much indebted to J. L. Austin’s classic study (1962) on “performative 
utterances”, statements that perform an action. Neither true nor false, these utterances 
still have the potential to create new reality (Stritzel 2007, 361). 
The notion of performativity opens up interesting perspectives over the discussion 
following the Russia-Georgia war. When Senator and presidential candidate John 
McCain declares in The Wall Street Journal on 14 August 2008 that “we are all 
Georgians”, this is undoubtedly a performative utterance in the Austinian sense. The 
rhetoric makes a distant conflict a potentially dangerous confrontation between “us” and 
“them”, invoking images of the Cold War and, supposedly, of strong presidential 
leadership in the face of a dangerous enemy. Separated from its context, however, 
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McCain’s statement would be meaningless. Crucial for analyzing the power relations 
inherent in speech acts, the importance of context has been the subject of an intense 
debate. Butler (1997, 141-151) identifies two different understandings of speech acts 
and social context, those of Bourdieu and Derrida. For Bourdieu, social power and the 
“force” of the performative are to be understood through an established social context. 
Consequently, a failed speech act is not backed by sufficient social power. Opposite to 
this, Butler (1997, 147) shows Derrida arguing that the force of the performative is 
derived precisely from its decontextualization, from its break with a prior context and 
its capacity to assume new contexts. For Derrida, 
[T]the failure of the performative is the condition of its possibility … That performative 
utterances can go wrong, be misapplied or misinvoked, is essential to their ‘proper’ functioning 
(Butler 1997, 151). 
Butler sides with Derrida in maintaining that a speech act is not only defined by its 
social context but also marked by its capacity to break with it. Performativity must thus 
be understood as a renewable action without clear origin or end (Butler 1997, 40). 
Stritzel (2007, 361-2) concludes that for Butler, it is not any pre-existing context but the 
speech  act  itself  that  has  the  power  to  create  authority  and  bring  about  change.  Butler  
follows Derrida also in discussing how a discourse gains authority through citing 
linguistic conventions and positioning itself in relation to existing discursive practices. 
She argues that if a performative succeeds, it is because 
[A]ction echoes prior actions, and accumulates the force of authority through the repetition or 
citation of a prior and authoritative set of practices. It is not simply that the speech act takes 
place within a practice, but that the act is itself a ritualized practice (Butler 1997, 51). 
Later in this thesis, the narratives on the Russia-Georgia war are shown to be ripe with 
this kind of positioning, for example through a widespread use of historical analogies.  
In security studies, probably the most influential application of the notion of 
performativity in the recent decades has been that of the Copenhagen School. Drawing 
on Austin among other influences (Stritzel 2007, 361), it has established itself as a 
credible challenger to traditional, mainly realist, theories on security and military 
strategy. Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, the founding fathers of the Copenhagen School, 
have argued that through speech acts, previously undefined issues are “securitized” in 
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order to reproduce the prevailing hierarchical conditions. 
The theory of securitization can be situated within the broader framework of critical 
security studies that aim at uncovering the epistemological and conceptual foundations 
of the orthodox conceptions of security (cf. Krause and Williams 1997). While this 
project has much in common with the Derridarian goal of celebrating the difference in 
World Politics promoted by Campbell and Der Derian, Stritzel (2007, 377) also points 
to an inherent tension within the securitization framework between the more 
postmodern/poststructuralist or “internalist” securitization theory and the 
constructivism-oriented or “externalist” readings.7 According to Stritzel, the internalist 
position concentrates on the event of the speech act itself and is more grounded in the 
concept of performativity, whereas the externalist position stresses that security 
articulations need to be related to their broader discursive context. 
In the course of this discussion on internalist and externalist readings of securitization, 
Stritzel appears to present an almost identical divide that Butler observes between 
Derrida and Bourdieu. Indeed, Stritzel refers to the internalist position as the 
“Derridarian and/or Butler” reading. The author himself sides with Bourdieu when he 
argues that, in the Copenhagen School, “too much weight is put on the semantic side of 
the speech act articulation at the expense of its social and linguistic relatedness and 
sequentiality” (ibid., 359). As a matter of fact, Stritzel proposes that “Bourdieu could 
give securitization theory a contextual twist” (ibid., 365). In the end, Stritzel explicitly 
argues for the externalist position, maintaining that the basic idea of security as a speech 
act is by itself too limited to allow a scholar to study “real-world securitizations” (ibid., 
362). 
When it comes to the social context of a speech act, the Copenhagen School has been 
particularly interested in societal aspects of security and the relationship between 
“elites” and “audiences” (cf. Wæver 1995). Going “beyond Copenhagen”, however, 
Stritzel (2007, 365) argues that Buzan, Wæver and others pay insufficient attention to 
the “situatedness” of speech acts and lack a comprehensive awareness of the existence 
of  a  social  sphere.  Finally,  Stritzel  is  not  satisfied  with  the  term  “speech  act”,  
maintaining that it is too focused on single events (see also McDonald 2008, 564). He 
                                               
7 Following Stritzel, later in the thesis the terms “internalist” and “externalist” are also used to refer to 
thinkers who, obviously, do not or did not consider themselves anything of the sort. 
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sees Wæver and Buzan as fluctuating between the terms “process” and “speech 
act”/“utterance” as if they were synonymous, thus blurring the line between the event 
and the context. Building on previous literature, Stritzel introduces the term “threat text” 
or simply “text” in place of “speech act” to “stress that linguistic structures can evolve 
sequentially over longer periods of time” (ibid., 374). 
In many ways, Stritzel’s understanding of threat texts comes close to the notion of 
narratives, which can certainly be seen as linguistic structures that evolve sequentially 
over longer periods of time. Firstly, Stritzel defines the text as a “rather durable product 
of linguistic and/or symbolic actions” (ibid., 370). Secondly, he argues that “the 
meaning of a threat text is not given … but generated – often as a result of a dynamic 
social process” (ibid., 370-371). And thirdly, reflecting on his framework, Stritzel 
himself refers to narratives (ibid., 370), implying that even if the two concepts are not 
identical, there is at least a strong connection between them: 
The better the compatibility of the articulated text/textual structure and the existing discourse 
(i.e. its ‘resonance’) and the better the positional power of securitizing actors, the easier it is for 
them to establish their preferred individual text as a dominant narrative for a larger collective. 
Aiming to take a step toward a more consistent understanding of securitization, Stritzel 
proposes a framework consisting of three elements: 
1) the performative force of the articulated threat texts 
2) their embeddedness in the existing discourses and 
3) the positional power of actors who influence the process of defining meaning. 
 
In  this  thesis,  Stritzel’s  framework  is  applied  to  analyze  the  U.S.  foreign  policy  
discussion that followed the Russia-Georgia war. According to this reading, various 
threat texts were presented during the discussion. They were constructed, nurtured and 
perceived as a part of a complicated intersubjective process. Some appeared to have 
been more efficient in their discursive purposes than others, being ultimately established 
as parts of the dominant narrative. Examining competing narratives instead of 
individual threat texts is argued to provide better understanding on how some texts and 
actors were empowered and others marginalized. 
The focus on narratives may also shed light on the internalist/externalist problematic, 
where Stritzel’s insightful framework ends up in difficulties. While his main 
contribution  is  to  distinguish  between  these  two  centers  of  gravity  and  elaborate  on  a  
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more developed externalist standpoint, the author also tries to find some common 
ground. He suggests that the internalists could develop the concept of performativity 
further. The externalists should, in turn, specify the notion of discursive embeddedness 
in constant dialogue with empirical studies (ibid., 377). Stritzel himself is not very 
thorough in discussing the importance of internalist insights for his own framework. For 
example, the proposed framework still seems to be vulnerable to the critique that Butler 
(1997, 158) is directing at Bourdieau: 
If one argues that language itself can only act to the extent that it is “backed” by existing social 
power, then one needs to supply a theory of how it is that social power “backs” language in this 
way. If language only represents the larger, institutional conditions that give it its force, then 
what is that relationship of “representation” that accounts for institutions being represented in 
language? … Performatives do not merely reflect prior social conditions, but produce a set of 
social effects, and though they are not always the effects of ‘official’ discourse, they nevertheless 
work their social power not only to regulate bodies, but to form them as well. 
To avoid too static an understanding of the social context, it should be kept in mind that 
the context itself changes constantly. In the present thesis, this is reflected for example 
in the discussion of neoconservatism’s journey from the political left to the political 
right, as well as in the analysis of the political context preceding the Russia-Georgia 
war. Attention must also be paid to how exactly the threat texts gain their performative 
force and become embedded in the existing discourses. 
It appears evident that one should look for internalist influences particularly in the 
element of Stritzel’s framework that focuses on the performative force of the articulated 
threat texts. Even though the author stresses that all elements of the framework are 
defined in terms of their relatedness to existing discourse, he acknowledges (2007, 373-
374)  that  also  in  an  externalist  reading  the  threat  texts  can  contain  a  dynamic  of  their  
own. In spite of the promising effort to clear up the theoretical field, it is precisely the 
notion of performativity, centrally linked to the internalist/externalist divide that 
continues to cause confusion within Stritzel’s framework. While the other two layers, 
the embeddedness in the existing discourses and the positional power of actors, clearly 
reflect an externalist and constructivist perspective, the performative force of the 
articulated threat text conjures up more postmodern images. 
For the purposes of the present thesis, Stritzel’s framework therefore not only offers an 
interesting perspective of combining aspects of postmodern and constructivist readings 
of narratives but also contains the warning that, as the last resort, this might not be 
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possible. As Stritzel himself puts it (ibid., 359): 
While these two centres [of gravity of securitization theory] could be reconciled to some extent, 
ultimately they reflect two rather autonomous readings of securitization and are based on two 
separate metatheoretical convictions. 
 2.3 Identifying and Analyzing Narratives 
Despite the promising theoretical insights on narrativity, one is left with little concrete 
advice about how to bring the theory to practice. What kind of stories should we look 
for, and where? How exactly are threat texts established as narratives? How can threat 
texts and narratives be identified and analyzed in source material? Or is it even possible 
to extract a discourse from its surroundings and put it under a looking glass? 
Christopher Browning’s Constructivism, Narrative and Foreign Policy Analysis: A Case 
Study of Finland (2008) contains one of the most thorough recent discussions on 
methodological questions related to narrativity, but even Browning, citing various 
competing narratives throughout the history of Finland, never really defines what makes 
a particular discourse a narrative and how one could recognize it. 
A critical, postmodern/poststructuralist reading of narratives as simplifying and 
oppressing discourses yields different theoretical frameworks than approaches based on 
an interest in how narratives relate to the social world and help to reproduce it. The 
former project could – and perhaps should – stay “inside the text” and proceed to 
deconstruction by analyzing the internal logic of the hegemonic narrative and making 
explicit what had been implicit. On the other hand, the latter’s key to success seems to 
lay precisely in the researcher’s ability to reach out from the text and scrutinize the 
mechanisms through which stories become embedded in their context. While Stritzel’s 
framework is firmly grounded in an externalist understanding of securitization, this 
thesis also keeps an eye out for the internalist perspectives. Especially in the discussion 
on the “performative force” of the threat texts in chapter five it is argued that the 
externalist reading alone may not be sufficient. 
Drawing on previous literature, Browning (2008) identifies four methodological 
approaches to studying narratives: 
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1) deconstructivist method 
2) juxtapositional method 
3) focusing on subjugated knowledges 
4) genealogical method. 
 
Browning embraces the genealogical method within the framework of social 
constructivism. For the purposes of this thesis, however, the most interesting part of 
Browning’s delineation seems to be the deconstructivist method that “aims to expose 
the contingent nature of discourse by showing how ‘orthodox meanings’ lack the stable 
foundations claimed for them and thereby indicating that other alternative readings were 
possible” (Browning 2008, 63). It is a useful starting point to assume that any particular 
threat text or narrative on the Russia-Georgia war is only one of many possible 
approaches to the crisis. 
Signs about the existence of competing threat texts and potential narratives can also be 
found in the source material. For example, during and after the Russia-Georgia war, 
many contemporary political analysts commented on the diversity of explanations for 
the crisis, and some pointed to the dominant role that a group described as 
neoconservatives was playing in the mainstream media (e. g. Brooks 2008b). On the 
other hand, the Copenhagen School has stressed the importance of context in the 
formation of speech acts. In order to identify narratives, one should thus look at the 
whole process and inquire how the threat texts on the Russia-Georgia war gain their 
performative force as well as how embedded they are in the prevailing discourse: what 
made it possible for such a story to develop in the United States in 2008? Following 
Hajer (2005, 300), 
The analysis of discursive constructions such as narratives, story lines or metaphors is especially 
powerful when done in the context of the study of the social-historical conditions in which the statements 
were produced and received. 
This thesis argues that neoconservatism was an inextricable element of the “social-
historical conditions” in which the statements following the Russia-Georgia war were 
produced and received. Through complex discursive dynamics and powerful speech 
acts, threat texts presented by mainly neoconservative commentators were woven into a 
narrative where – using Burke’s wording (cited in Mottier 2005, 260) – one  can 
identify “act [the war], scene [South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Georgia], agent [Russia, 
Georgia, the runaway territories, USA, EU etc.], agency and purpose”. Think tanks and 
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mainstream media helped to “make sense” of the crisis by “building the ‘and, and, and’ 
connections between actions and events” (Mottier 2005, 260). It is argued in chapter 
three that this resulted in a “neoconservative narrative”: a powerful and perhaps even 
hegemonic interpretation of the conflict. 
Several studies show that consciously looking for alternative explanations and readings 
for  the  event  or  process  under  scrutiny  is  also  an  important  way  of  revealing  the  
contested and contingent nature of the dominant narrative that is presented as fixed and 
obvious. For example, Crafword and Lipschutz (1998, 150) demonstrate how the 
dominant explanations for the war in former Yugoslavia were changing over time to 
vindicate prevailing conceptions of specific security requirements. According to the 
alternative interpretation of the authors, the war should have been viewed as a conflict 
between state institutions and civil society. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, this 
reading looks for the root causes for the conflict in the 1970s when liberal groups 
promoting civil society and interest politics were purged. Finally, Crawford and 
Lipschutz show how their understanding of the conflict leads to entirely different policy 
recommendations from those adopted in the West. In a similar attempt from a different 
theoretical perspective, Patomäki (2002) presents an alternative reading of Thucydides’s 
Melos dialogue to reinterpret a crisis that took place more than 2400 years ago. 
Patomäki’s focus on alternative explanations differs from the postmodern approaches in 
its conviction that, eventually, a systematic scholar can make a judgment about the truth 
of various hypotheses (Patomäki 2002, 141). 
This  kind  of  evidence  makes  it  easier  to  argue  for  the  existence  of  a  neoconservative  
narrative, but does not eliminate the fact that ultimately all narratives only exist in the 
minds of story-tellers – in this case the author of this thesis – and that even when based 
on the same source material, different stories could be told. Furthermore, Jokinen et al. 
remind us (1999, 23) that discourses themselves are not monolithic and that focusing on 
a narrative is always artificial since there are narratives within narratives. Discussing the 
narrativity of all social science, Becker (1997, 19) writes: 
[W]e push ourselves to be ingenious and connect the things we’re telling about in ingenious 
ways that remove anomalies and make our basic picture simple, clean, intuitively apprehensible, 
“obvious”.  If we tell such a story, we need only cite some facts and everyone will believe it; we 
will believe it ourselves and be relieved that we have after all found some order in the world. We 
have a neat story or image. Unfortunately, it is one easily punctured by inconvenient facts. 
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 2.4 Sources 
Only days after the preliminary cease-fire agreement was reached between Russia and 
Georgia and while the Western media was still scrambling for information about the 
events in the Caucasus, the Washington-based think tanks already brought specialists 
and policy-makers together to assess the significance and implications of the events. 
Two seminars were organized by The American Enterprise Institute (AEI) and The 
Brookings Institution after the outbreak of the hostilities on 7 August and before the 
ceasefire agreement was signed by Georgia on 15 August and by Russia on 16 August.8 
The transcripts of these seminars make up the primary source material of this thesis.9  In 
addition, attention is paid to the discussion in the U.S. mainstream media. It is 
commonly asserted that there is a close link between the most important think tanks and 
the prominent newspapers. For example McCormick (1998, 491) sees op-eds in the 
“key elite newspapers” – among which he counts The New York Times, The Washington 
Post, The Wall Street Journal, The Los Angeles Times, and The Christian Science 
Monitor – as a channel for the think tanks to present their argument and influence the 
general discussion. It seems therefore reasonable to use the op-eds discussing the 
Russia-Georgia war as a supporting material. Associates and directors of influential 
think tanks also often appear on political programs on TV and radio. 
A convenient time frame for the analysis reaches from the beginning of the war on 7 
August 2008 until the sudden shift of focus in the public interest on the economic crisis 
after the collapse of the Lehman Brothers on 15 September 2008.10  This does not mean 
that the discussion would have ended altogether: op-eds about the war continued to be 
published during the fall 2008, and the Russia-Georgia war is still a subject of academic 
and political debate (see for example Stelzenmüller 2010). However, it seems feasible to 
argue that the financial meltdown significantly diminished the urgency of the debate 
about the crisis in the Caucasus. 
                                               
8  The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace also organized a seminar titled Crisis in the 
Caucasus: A Conversation with Nino Burjanavze on 4 September 2008, but this was more focused on 
Georgian views on the conflict. Burjanavze is the former speaker of the parliament of Georgia. 
9  The author participated in the AEI seminar. Transcripts or video recordings of the events are available 
online. Brookings: http://www.brookings.edu/events/2008/0814_georgia.aspx; 
AEI: http://www.aei.org/event/1769#tpt [accessed September 23, 2010]. 
10  The EU investigation into the causes of the conflict, led by the Swiss ambassador Heidi Tagliavini, 
sets the end of the period under review at 8 September 2008, when “the main developments were no 
longer taking place in the military sphere but, once again, in the realm of politics and diplomacy” 
(Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia 2009, 9). 
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One  of  the  most  influential  criticisms  directed  at  the  Copenhagen  School’s  theory  of  
securitization relates to the narrow definition of the speech act. It has been argued that 
the School relies too much on language and neglects other forms through which 
meaning is communicated, such as images or bureaucratic practices (McDonald 2008, 
568-569). Despite the evident relevance of this criticism, it is not possible to include 
this type of material in the present thesis, since the primary source material is more 
suitable for a traditional, narrower understanding of textuality. 
As of September 2010, there is still little academic research on the subject. Ron Asmus 
presents a detailed account of how the Russia-Georgia war was perceived in Washington 
in A Little War that Shook the World: Georgia, Russia, and the Future of the West 
(2010). Asmus’s description on the developments leading up to the crisis and its 
consequences for the United States is, however, more policy-oriented than academic, 
and the author’s conviction in the necessity of bringing Georgia into the NATO reflects 
on  his  argumentation.  Not  coincidentally,  Asmus  was  among  the  “liberal  hawks”  who  
signed a letter supporting the war in Iraq, and he has worked with neoconservatives on 
the Committee to expand NATO (Vaïsse 2010, 253). 
Thomas Sattler, Shanker Satyanath and Joshua A. Tucker (2009) pay attention to the use 
of historical analogies in the discussion that followed the Russia-Georgia war and, 
interestingly, identify an “empire building narrative” that they consider a dominant 
interpretation of the conflict. Nevertheless, from a starting point that bears resemblance 
to that of the present thesis, the authors proceed to a different path, offering an 
alternative explanation for the crisis that is based on a signaling model. Finally, Justin 
Vaïsse’s Neoconservatism: The Biography of a Movement (2010) is a recent attempt to 
analyze the history and importance of U.S. neoconservatism from a European 
perspective. The August war does not figure prominently in Vaïsse’s book which, 
however, provides important insights into the state of the school of thought during the 
crisis in the Caucasus. 
The American Enterprise Institute was the first think tank in Washington D.C. to 
organize a seminar on the Russia-Georgia war. The event, titled The War in the 
Caucasus: An Initial Assessment, brought three resident AEI scholars (Leon Aron, 
Frederick Kagan and Thomas Donnelly) together with two representatives of the U.S. 
Army  (Lt.  Col.  Bob  Hamilton  and  Lt.  Col  Ralph  Peters)  to  analyze  the  situation  in  
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Georgia on 13 August 2008. A lengthy discussion followed after the presentations. The 
Brookings Institution followed suit on 14 August featuring the former Deputy Secretary 
of State and the Brookings President Strobe Talbott, Daniel Benjamin (Brookings), 
Steven Pifer (Brookings), Cory Welt (Georgetown University), Robert Kagan and 
Martha Brill Olcott (both from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace). 
Since  there  was  still  no  clear  overview  on  the  events  in  Georgia,  one  of  the  primary  
functions of these seminars was to give a situational assessment on what was happening 
on the ground (Benjamin 2008, Donnelly 2008). At the same time, however, the 
participants already started to assess the longer-term ramifications of the crisis. In an 
introduction to the Brookings seminar, Daniel Benjamin set three goals for the 
discussion.  First,  the  panelists  were  to  analyze  the  impact  of  the  war  on  Georgian  
internal  and  foreign  policy.  Second,  what  where  the  lessons  that  the  United  States,  
Europe and the other former Soviet States bordering Russia should take away from the 
episode?  Third,  the  seminar  attempted  to  assess  the  roles  of  the  United  States  and  
Europe in resolving the conflict. 
The importance of think tanks in the making of U.S. foreign policy has been analyzed 
extensively. They are often seen as enjoying a particular leverage in the areas of foreign 
and defense policy. Snow and Brown (1996, 239) define think tanks as the “community 
of individuals with expertise on public policy matters (the policy elite), which attempts 
to use its knowledge to affect public policy”. The largest concentration of think tanks is 
located in the Washington, D.C. area, or “inside the beltway” referring to the Interstate 
95  that  circles  the  capital.  Some  estimate  that  there  are  more  people  employed  to  
influence the government than there are government employees (ibid. 225). As opposed 
to  interest  groups  such  as  the  American  Israel  Public  Affairs  Committee  (AIPAC),  the  
National Rifle Association (NRA) or the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), think 
tanks are closer to academic thinking and a scholarly view of policy: people working for 
them tend to come from universities, government positions or military backgrounds 
(ibid. 239-242). The most prestigious institutions have traditionally served as an 
important recruiting pool for incoming administrations, as well as “governments in 
waiting” for the opposition party. They conduct research, organize seminars and events, 
publish policy-papers and provide specialists to discuss the topics of the day in the 
media. 
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Think tanks have been considered relatively successful in influencing U.S. foreign 
policy (see e. g. McCormick 1998, 491). The George W. Bush administration was also 
known to pay close attention to the opinions of especially conservative think tanks 
(Abramowitz 2006). The two events included in the source material were organized by 
institutions  that  are  often  seen  to  occupy  the  opposite  sides  of  the  political  divide.  
Brookings and the AEI are both officially independent and non-partisan, and neither of 
them professes to a political agenda. Nevertheless, Brookings has always been 
identified with liberal positions and is sometimes referred to as the Democratic think 
tank (McCormick 1998, 492; Snow and Brown 1996, 243).11  Founded in 1916, it is 
unquestionably one of the most influential foreign policy think tanks in the world (cf. 
McGann 2010). In August 2008 it was also the employer of several future officials of 
the Obama administration. 
If Brookings is the standard-bearer of the moderate and liberal-leaning approaches to 
foreign policy, the American Enterprise Institute is included among the most important 
conservative think tanks. Since its founding in 1943 by employer-led and free-trade 
groups for the purpose of opposing federal intervention in the economy, it has carved 
itself a niche as a strong conservative voice on foreign policy issues (McCormick 1998, 
492; Vaïsse 2010, 206). During the Cold War, the AEI became known for its opposition 
to détente (Wittkopf, Kegley, and Scott 2002, 298). Starting from the late 1970s, it has 
gradually become known as the bastion for U.S. neoconservatism (Vaïsse 2010, 206). 
                                               
11 However, Rich (2004, 226-227) defines it as “not identifiable/centrist”. 
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 3 From Threat Texts to Narratives 
The following chapter examines in detail the content of the threat texts about the 
Russia-Georgia war. The multitude of explanations for and interpretations of the conflict 
paints a picture of a discursive chaos where experts and politicians compete to have 
their voices heard. As was demonstrated in chapter 2.2, Stritzel’s argument contains an 
implicit assumption that while individual threat texts cannot necessarily be considered 
narratives by themselves, they can somehow “be established” as narratives if the 
necessary conditions are fulfilled. Since Stritzel does not discuss how this might 
happen, chapter three attempts to clarify the process. 
The first part of this chapter presents a variety of threat texts on the Russia-Georgia war 
and analyzes their most contested features. The second part observes the common traits 
of the neoconservative threat texts and discusses the process of narrative formation 
through the attachment of actorship, underlying motives, causal connections and 
consequences to the threat texts. Stritzel’s (2007, 367) insight that “an actor cannot be 
significant as a social actor and a speech act cannot have an impact on social relations 
without a situation that constitutes them as significant” is seized upon by investigating 
the political and social context for the discussion that followed the Russia-Georgia war. 
Preparing ground for chapter four that focuses on the positional power of the actors 
presenting the threat texts, the debate is placed against the specific historical 
background of U.S. neoconservatism. In the process, the notion of narrativity is argued 
to present a powerful tool for analyzing the “embeddedness” and “resonance” so 
important for the securitization theory.  
 3.1 Threat Texts on the Russia-Georgia War 
Stritzel’s notion of threat texts is firmly rooted in the Copenhagen School understanding 
of securitization, which has been criticized of being too narrow in the sense that the 
nature of the act is defined solely in terms of the designation of threats to security. 
According to McDonald (2008, 564), such a framework “encourages a 
conceptualization of security politics as inherently negative and reactionary”. However, 
28 
 
since the present thesis is in many ways an empirical test of Stritzel’s framework, it 
seems justified to stick to Stritzel’s terminology of threat texts or simply texts. 
From the point of view of competing narratives, threat texts about what was happening 
in the Caucasus are critical for setting the context and the broad framework for possible 
and acceptable explanations for the conflict. Conversely, it is precisely the 
embeddedness of the texts in the existing discourse and their capacity to cite prior and 
authoritative practices that allows them to survive and grow in importance. Adding the 
notion of narrativity to Stritzel’s focus on the formulation and reception of threat texts 
should be able to complement the securitization framework, which according to 
McDonald  (ibid.)  has  been  unable  to  answer  the  question  of  why  particular  
representations resonate with relevant constituencies. 
Indeed, too radical interpretations of the nature of the Russia-Georgia war were 
effectively brushed off. At the American Enterprise Institute seminar, a speaker from the 
audience proposed that, instead of comparing Russia in 2008 with the Soviet Union in 
1968, a more accurate analogy would be between the human rights violations by 
Georgia in South Ossetia and by Russia in Chechnya (Asoyan 2008). The panelist’s 
response bordered with incivility: 
I mean, my God, where are your brains, media folks? You’re not asking any questions, you’re 
just parroting Moscow’s party line. It’s like the New York Times in the 1930s. There is no famine 
in Ukraine, all the peasants are happy here (Peters 2008). 
In a similar move, when another audience question at the AEI seminar referred to the 
accusations of the Georgian troops committing a genocide in South Ossetia, these were 
labeled as “absurd” and “amusing” by F. Kagan, who also implicitly referred to the 
ongoing discussion as a discursive battleground: “by framing the story as a question of 
genocide, the Russians have already determined what the agenda is”. 
As a matter of fact, both the setting and the duration of the story were contested in the 
differing explanations for the war. At the seminar organized by the Brookings Institute 
on 14 August 2008, the panelists were playfully squabbling over the beginning of the 
current conflict: while Steve Pfifer divided the crisis into three stages which started on 
Friday 8 August 2008 and continued at the time of the seminar as a tenuous ceasefire, 
Cory Welt considered the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 the beginning of the first stage. 
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It appears evident that opinions on where to begin the story are centrally linked to 
beliefs about the actors’ motivation and the reasons behind the war. 
Perhaps even more importantly, accounts on the conflict differed also in geographical 
scope. Some experts, such as Martha Brill Olcott, went to great lengths to stress that the 
conflict should be understood in a particular geographic and historic context:  
I think it’s really important to keep – to take actions that keep the issue localized, to not try to 
make it an issue of the U.S.-Russian relationship writ large, but really to focus it on the situation 
in Ossetia today (Olcott 2008b). 
At least partly, this kind of view seems to have been supported by the White House. 
According to Asmus (2010, 177-178), the main goal of the Bush administration 
concerning the Russia-Georgia war was to avoid a greater confrontation between the 
East  and  the  West  that,  in  a  catastrophe  scenario,  could  lead  to  a  new Cold  War.  This  
placed President Bush in a difficult situation in relation to the growing pressure from his 
political right, since the President feared that an aggressive U.S. response “would make 
the danger of a U.S.-Russian confrontation, and not Russian behavior toward Georgia, 
the story” (ibid.). At the same time, Asmus shows how the top White House officials 
disagreed on the geographical dimension of the conflict (ibid., 187). Whereas National 
Security Adviser Stephen Hadley believed that Russia was only focused on Georgia, 
vice president Dick Cheney “had a different and harder-edged view of Moscow’s 
goals”. 
Other commentators explicitly rejected the notion that the Russia-Georgia war should 
be treated as a local or regional issue. In The Wall Street Journal on 14 August 2008, 
Senator John McCain addressed those who wondered why such a distant conflict should 
concern  them  –  “[a]fter  all,  Georgia  is  a  small,  remote  and  obscure  place”  –  by  
reminding that “history is often made in remote, obscure places”. Similarly, Robert 
Kagan argued in The Washington Post on 11 August that one should forget the details 
and look at the big picture: 
The details of who did what to precipitate Russia’s war against Georgia are not very important. 
Do you recall the precise details of the Sudeten Crisis that led to Nazi Germany’s invasion of 
Czechoslovakia? Of course not, because that morally ambiguous dispute is rightly remembered 
as a minor part of a much bigger drama … a geopolitical power struggle has emerged between a 
resurgent and revanchist Russia on one side and the European Union and the United States on the 
other. 
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Assessing what had happened and what was still happening in the Caucasus was the 
explicitly stated purpose of the seminars both at Brookings (Benjamin 2008) and at AEI 
(Donnelly 2008), as well as the starting point for most of the analysis in the media. At 
the AEI seminar, the panelists were almost unanimous in their analysis of the situation. 
As Frederick Kagan put it (2008), this was “the extreme unedifying spectacle of the 
empire formerly known as the Soviet Union beating heck out of a tiny little state on its 
frontier”. Ralph Peters (2008) was the sharpest critic of Russia’s actions at the AEI, 
describing the war as an “active, unprovoked aggression” and even a “terrorist attack”. 
Peters  also  had  a  gloomy view of  the  situation  as  a  whole  and  the  implications  of  the  
crisis for the United States: 
[W]e are faced with a resurgent major power, not superpower but a resurgent major military 
power with imperialist megalomaniacal ambitions led by the most effective, and I would argue, 
the most brilliant leader in the world today, outclassing everyone I can see. 
The other speakers at the AEI were hardly much more optimistic in their assessment. 
Leon Aron (2008) labeled the conflict as an “a la carte war”, one that Russia chose to 
fight regardless of how it started. According to Frederick Kagan’s assessment, 
Moscow’s actions were aimed at NATO because “Czar Vladimir the First has the 
objective of re-creating the Soviet Empire in everything that the Russians now call the 
‘near abroad’”. 
At Brookings, the opinions were more divided. Besides Olcott’s emphasis on the 
regional  aspects  of  the  conflict,  Cory  Welt  (2008)  focused  on  the  shortcomings  of  
international mediation in the years preceding the war. Strobe Talbott, on the other hand, 
took  a  relatively  hard  line  on  Russia,  arguing  that  if  Moscow  continues  to  prevent  its  
neighbors from entering the Western institutions, that “calls into doubt the entire 
premise of U.S., European and Western international relations with Russia and will need 
to be taken into account by the next President of the United States”. 
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 3.2 Motives and Consequences 
Above, narratives were defined as stories that, arranging seemingly isolated events into 
patterns that imply intentionality and rationality, work to simplify complex 
developments and privilege certain interpretations over others. These stories were 
shown to consist of certain basic elements, such as time dimension, causal connections, 
and a focus on motives and purposes of the actors. It is now argued that these elements 
are central to the process where separate threat texts are woven into a broader narrative. 
In addition to assessing what was happening in the Caucasus, the participants in the 
foreign policy discussion also wanted to know why. Think tank seminars, newspaper 
op-eds and TV shows were filled with speculation on the actors’ motives and goals, as 
well as the likely consequences of the crisis. These questions feature centrally also in 
the more academic research conducted after the crisis, as demonstrated by Asmus’s 
interest in “how and why this war started, how it ended, and what it means for the 
future” (2010, 7). The search for motives and consequences is important for establishing 
the causal connections which make it possible to speak of narratives or “plots” instead 
of mere threat texts.12 
In Asmus’s analysis, the discussion that followed the Russia-Georgia war boils down to 
the question whether different choices by Western decision-makers, particularly 
concerning Georgia’s NATO membership, could have prevented the crisis (2010, 138). 
Indeed, an important part of the analysts’ and political commentators’ accounts on the 
war consisted of trying to explain why the conflict had started: what were the 
underlying reasons and more immediate causes, what mistakes had been made, and 
what were the goals and motivations of various actors. A year after the war, the 
Tagliavini report asked the same questions, concluding (2009, 31) that 
[A] series of mistakes, misperceptions and missed opportunities on all sides accumulated up to a 
point where the danger of an explosion of violence became real. 
The report mentions the Bucharest summit of April 2008 and the independence of 
Kosovo as complicating factors in the international context and maintains that the 
                                               
12  For E.M. Forster (2002, 71), causality is the main difference between a story and a plot. According to 
Forster, “the king died and then the queen died” is a story. “The king died, and then the queen died of 
grief” is a plot. 
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indecisive actions of the international community contributed to the unfolding of the 
crisis. 
In  Washington,  many  tried  to  view  the  situation  from  Moscow’s  angle.  Assistant  
Secretary of State Daniel Fried referred to a “Russia narrative” in which a revanchist 
country had had enough of its weakness in the 90s and was “not going to take it 
anymore” (Kessler 2010). At the AEI seminar, Frederick Kagan noted that the media 
were right to point out at that Georgia was not innocent. Kagan however concluded that 
“in this most recent iteration, the Russians have been the primary drivers”. 
One  of  the  most  elaborate  attempts  to  understand  Russia’s  actions  was  Martha  Brill  
Olcott’s presentation at the Brookings seminar on 14 August. She argued that the main 
reason for the conflict was “a fundamental difference between Russia and the West on 
the question of what constituted Georgian territorial integrity”. In the discussion that 
followed her remarks, Olcott had to justify her position at several points and was even 
forced  to  insist  that  she  does  not  “defend  what  they’re  [the  Russians]  doing”  but  just  
“explains” it. Discussing the importance of the independence of Kosovo for the events 
in the Caucasus, Olcott had a tense exchange with Robert Kagan: 
Kagan: Martha, you don’t have to defend Moscow’s position. 
Olcott: I’m not. I’m just reporting what people say and talk about in the environment, and – 
Kagan: No, but it’s an illegitimate – I just consider that an illegitimate argument, that because 
the West bullied – and if you’re hearing this everywhere – I’m not responding to you. We hear 
this everywhere – and here, including in the United States, including in Washington – because 
the West bullied Russia in Kosovo, that’s why Russia could do this. The West did not bully 
Russia in Kosovo. 
... 
Olcott: My question, though, is really – and I don’t have the full answer to it, how the Russian 
population views it. And I think that the Russian leadership, to some degree, is responding to 
what it believes are popular actions. 
 
Despite Kagan’s complaints about the U.S. media buying illegitimate arguments, 
judging from the news coverage there was no great appeal to empathizing with Russia’s 
goals and motivations. Quite the contrary: the general tone of the public discourse was 
clearly siding with Georgia: Andrew Meier commented in The Los Angeles Times on 20 
August 2008 that the “[a]nti-Russian fervor threatens to hit fever pitch in Washington 
this week”. 
There  was  also  a  lively  public  debate  in  the  foreign  policy  circles  on  what  the  United  
States should do about the situation. Many commentators already weighed the long-term 
consequences of the crisis, and the seminars at Brookings and AEI made no exception. 
33 
 
While the administration was still searching for a suitable policy response, especially 
right-wing commentators called for aggressive measures against Russia. At the AEI, 
Ralph Peters insisted that the White House had plenty of options: 
There is much that can be done: kick them [Russia] out of the G8, take them on the WTO, cancel 
the Sochi Olympics, various kinds of defense pacts and agreements with Ukraine and Georgia. 
Look at the – scrutinize Russian banks, their international transactions, scrutinize corporations, 
there is a lot that could be done. 
An editorial in The Wall Street Journal on 13 August 2008 also speculated about 
expelling Russia from the G8, barring its entry into the WTO and threatening to boycott 
the Sochi Olympics. These demands had the unanimous support of neoconservative 
commentators (see for example Boot 2008, F. Kagan 2008b, Krauthammer 2008a), but 
there was little hope that they would significantly change the situation on the ground. At 
Brookings, Robert Kagan reminded the audience that Putin would not be the first leader 
in history willing to pay such a price for what could be considered a significant strategic 
achievement. 
However, the push for punitive measures against Russia seems to have been one key 
denominator for what in the media was dubbed as a neoconservative rhetoric. Katrina 
Vanden Heuvel (2008) wrote about “ultra-neocons who demand that Georgia’s – and 
Ukraine’s NATO membership be expedited and that Russia be excluded from the G-8”, 
counting John McCain among this lot. On the other hand, Andrew Meier noted in The 
Los Angeles Times on 20 August 2008 that, in addition to McCain’s “Russophobia”, 
“the cries to shove Moscow back into the cold are coming from both sides of the aisle”, 
including Barack Obama. 
The White House’s response, however, was muted. In several statements, President 
Bush, Vice-president Cheney and Secretary of State Rice condemned Russia’s actions 
and demanded Moscow to respect Georgia’s territorial integrity or risk isolation (BBC 
2008, Kessler 2008). Nevertheless, Asmus (2010; 178, 190) argues that there was a 
clear strategic calculation by the U.S. leadership to “step back and not try to lead”, 
leaving the main responsibility for negotiating a ceasefire to the EU and the OSCE.13 
According  to  Asmus,  the  decision  was  taken  after  a  heated  internal  debate,  where  
                                               
13  It has been discussed afterwards whether Bush’s uncharacteristic response to the crisis was indeed 
strategic thinking or rather due to weakness of the lame-duck administration (see e.g. Asmus 2010, 
190-191). 
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several senior White House advisers had pushed for consideration of “limited military 
options”  (ibid., 186-187). Finally, the White House settled on three goals: stop the 
fighting, prevent a regime change and make it clear to Moscow that the attack had not 
been worth it (ibid., 177). 
The neoconservatives found the adopted measures clearly inadequate. This is an 
indication that the neoconservative narrative, though powerful, was not universal or 
clearly hegemonic. At the AEI, the initial verdict of the administration was that of a 
complete failure. Ralph Peters, describing himself ashamed of the lame response by the 
White House, summed up the message sent to the U.S. allies as “America won’t come 
through for you – especially if you don’t have oil or gas”. An editorial in The Wall Street 
Journal on 13 August 2008 criticized the administration for stumbling and warned the 
president of ending his tenure “on a Carter-esque note of weakness”. According to the 
administration’s critics, indecisiveness had even stronger risks for the west than punitive 
measures. John McCain laid out the philosophy behind this thinking in The Wall Street 
Journal on 14 August 2008 by arguing that 
The world has learned at great cost the price of allowing aggression against free nations to go 
unchecked … we must make clear to Russia’s leaders that the benefits they enjoy from being 
part of the civilized world require their respect for the values, stability and peace of that world. 
Interestingly, even the strongest rhetoric calling for aggressive measures against Russia 
seems to have had an almost fatalistic undertone. The advocates of punitive action did 
not believe their advice would be heeded any more than they had faith in the outgoing 
administration’s capacity to handle the issue. This is illustrated by a sarcastic exchange 
between Frederick Kagan and Ralph Peters, referring to President Bush’s visit to the 
Olympics after Peters had listed options for deterring Russia: 
F. Kagan: I also think we’re probably not going to do any of it either, unfortunately. 
Peters: We’ll say a few things. 
F. Kagan: We’ll say a few things, right, but well, in between quarters in the basketball game. 
Peters: If Lebron says so. 
 
 
There was also a widespread fear that if Russia would not be punished, after Georgia it 
would turn its eyes on Ukraine and then perhaps on the Baltic countries (cf. Aron 2008a, 
2008b, Boot 2008). Moreover, the administration’s response was seen to have become a 
test for the U.S. credibility (The Wall Street Journal 13 August 2008). 
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From a purely discursive standpoint, the explanations that painted the Russia-Georgia 
war as a local or regional conflict dating back to complex historical developments seem 
to have been more challenging than the dramatic accounts of a potentially dangerous 
confrontation between the East and the West. Contrary to the straightforward policy 
recommendations of the neoconservatives, it was not clear what action the USA should 
take to mend the situation if the war was understood as a result of inadequate 
international mediation (Welt) or differing conceptions of territorial integrity (Olcott). 
Remarkably, at the Brookings seminar on 14 August, neither Welt nor Olcott attempted 
to give concrete policy recommendations.  While Olcott  admitted not being able to see 
Russia moving back to the status quo, Welt urged the parties to proceed with 
negotiations and aim at a serious international presence in the region, acknowledging 
that this would have to be a multi-year process. 
The immediate lessons and more long-term consequences of the Russia-Georgia war 
were animatedly debated. How would the story end? At the AEI seminar, the panelists 
pointed to many concrete implications of the conflict. Russia had made clear that 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia would not rejoin Georgia (F. Kagan 2008), and the question 
now was whether Georgia itself could survive as a viable state (Peters 2008). Moscow 
had also asserted a right to defend the life and dignity of its citizens regardless of where 
they live. In addition, it had managed to send the message that Western parties should 
reconsider investing in pipelines in the Caucasus. Finally, the United States should 
reassess  the  notion  that  it  could  cooperate  with  Russia  in  the  global  war  on  terrorism  
and stop subcontracting elements of its foreign policy to states that are dubiously 
aligned with its interests (F. Kagan 2008). 
Regardless  of  the  commentator,  the  future  of  NATO  was  considered  to  be  one  of  the  
most  important  issues  that  the  Russia-Georgia  war  had  raised.  To  Frederick  Kagan,  a  
central  message  from  Moscow  had  been  to  remind  that  if  Georgia  had  joined  NATO,  
Russians would have been fighting Americans – so better not accept applications by 
Georgia and Ukraine in the future either. Robert Kagan assessed that the Russia-Georgia 
war had deepened the east-west divide in Europe where the “front-line states” and 
geographically more distant countries have an entirely different approach to dealing 
with Russia. For Kagan himself, the crisis in Caucasus signified nothing less than “the 
official return of history” (2008b). 
36 
 
The neoconservatives were able to present a convincing analysis on what had happened 
in  the  Caucasus  and  why,  what  were  the  probable  consequences  of  the  crisis  and  how 
the United States should act. Little by little, the neoconservative threat texts were 
established as a sufficiently unified narrative that added up to more than the sum of its 
parts. This was possible by tying events together through the establishment of causal 
connections and actorship, which – drawing on E.M. Forster – resulted in a rather 
dramatic and easily presentable “plot” for the crisis in the Caucasus. Other, often more 
complicated and nuanced interpretations of the conflict found it hard to compete with 
the neoconservative narrative. 
It is of course difficult to single out particular moments when threat texts become 
established as narratives. Bruner (1991, 18-19) writes about “cobbling” stories together 
to make them into a whole, a process which he coins “narrative accrual”. According to 
Bruner, one mechanism through which this happens is the imposition of “bogus 
historical-causal entailment” (emphasis in the original), for example seeing the 
assassination of Archduke Ferdinand as “causing” the World War I. The importance of 
historical lessons for introducing causality and meaning to narratives will be discussed 
in more detail in chapter five. 
 3.3 Context in the Existing Discourse 
Recent contributions to the securitization theory agree that the Copenhagen School pays 
insufficient attention to the aspects of the speech act that relate to contextuality and the 
role of the existing discourse. According to McDonald (2008, 564), some of Wæver’s 
concepts such as the “facilitating conditions” and the “audience” are “so undertheorized 
as to ultimately remain outside the framework itself”. Stritzel’s framework attempts to 
address this deficiency by a strong focus on the existing discourse, defined by the author 
as “a complex bundle of simultaneous and sequential interrelated acts, interactions 
between the text and larger discursive practices in which it is embedded” (Stritzel 2008, 
371). Using the example of organized crime, Stritzel argues that texts often come with a 
baggage of historically evolved practices out of which and toward which they were 
articulated. For example, fictional representations such as a myth of the charismatic 
leader and various cult icons (Thompson machine gun, gangster suit, Italian accent etc.) 
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are shown to have resonated strongly with the moralistic and religious discourse on the 
“evilness” of modern urbanity (ibid., 371-372). 
But what does it mean for a threat text to “resonate” with a given discursive context? 
And how can the apparent effectiveness of the neoconservative narrative in explaining 
the reasons for and the consequences of the Russia-Georgia war be analyzed in terms of 
the existing discource? At times, differentiating between the context of the threat texts 
and  the  other  dimensions  of  Stritzel’s  framework  –  positional  power  of  the  actors  and  
the performative force of the presented texts – appears difficult and even artificial. 
Stritzel acknowledges this himself, underlining the importance of considering the 
interrelatedness of ‘performative force’ and ‘embeddedness in (linguistic) discourse’ 
(ibid., 372). 
Neoconservative intellectuals such as Robert Kagan or Bill Kristol had of course 
worked to shape the context they themselves operated in 2008. In 1996, Kagan and 
Kristol published an article titled Toward A Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy in Foreign 
Affairs. The writers argued that conservatives had lost their pace in foreign policy: while 
they disdained the multilateralism of the Clinton administration, they also resisted the 
temptation of Buchanan’s “neoisolationism”. Kagan and Kristol went on to challenge 
this “lukewarm consensus about America’s reduced role in a post-Cold War world” and 
stated that the first objective of the U.S. foreign policy should be the position of a 
“benevolent global hegemony”: to preserve and enhance the strategic and ideological 
predominance of the country by “strengthening America’s security, supporting its 
friends, advancing its interests, and standing up for its principles around the world.” 
According to Kagan and Kristol, there lied a peril in believing that major ideological 
confrontations between the United States and its opponents belonged to the past: 
The ubiquitous post-Cold War question – where is the threat? – is thus misconceived. In a world 
in which peace and American security depend on American power and the will to use it, the main 
threat the United States faces now and in the future is its own weakness. American hegemony is 
the only reliable defense against a breakdown of peace and international order. The appropriate 
goal of American foreign policy, therefore, is to preserve that hegemony as far into the future as 
possible. 
Even though written more than ten years before the events in 2008, this article that has 
come to be considered a formulation of the new neoconservative agenda (cf. Heilbrunn 
2004, 124; Vaïsse 2010, 230) gives key insight to the discursive context of and the 
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political motivation behind the neoconservative narrative on the Russia-Georgia war. 
Even the setbacks in Iraq and Afghanistan did not change the central neoconservative 
convictions. As Heilbrunn put it (2004, 126): 
If the administration fails in Iraq, many conservatives will endorse a kind of realpolitik that 
has not served the GOP well in the past. Neoconservatives won’t. 
More and more, there was a clear moralistic overtone in the neoconservatives’ 
arguments in the 1990s and early 2000s, visible already in Kagan and Kristol’s call for 
actively promoting the Western principles of governance – democracy, free markets and  
respect for liberty – abroad. Idealistic foreign policy, extreme interventionism, and 
emphasis of democracy-building thus became neoconservative hallmarks (Lowry 2004). 
Indeed, if neoconservatism on the eve of the war in Georgia should have been pinned 
down to a single vision, it might have been “promoting democracy abroad”. This was 
combined with a firm belief in the U.S. military might. A polemic quote by Rachel 
Maddow, a leftist political analyst, is descriptive of public perceptions of 
neoconservatism immediately after the outbreak of the Georgian crisis: 
[T]he neoconservative position is that, “You know, look what we did in Gulf War I, look at those 
smart bombs, that only took five minutes when we topple, we did what we wanted to do there.”  
Ever since then, the neocon position has been, that using military force is something  that is 
precise, that has predictable consequences that always gets us what we want and no Americans 
die. They’ve got this magical idea of American military omnipotence that we can use our 
military anywhere to accomplish any sort of objective and there’ll never be any blowback 
(MSNBC, Countdown with Keith Olbermann on 11 August 2008). 
Energetic support for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan never meant that 
neoconservatives would have forgotten Russia. While Moscow’s uneasiness over the 
NATO enlargement, Washington’s backing of the color revolutions in Ukraine and 
Georgia  as  well  as  the  independence  of  Kosovo  were  the  most  visible  signs  of  the  
increasing tensions between the Cold War superpowers, neoconservative analysts were 
also quick to point to more subtle but, in their opinion, just as worrying trends. Citing a 
growing centralization of power, a turn away from liberalism and a “return of Great 
Power nationalism”, Robert Kagan (2008a, 13) declared just a few months before the 
August war that “[i]f Russia was where history most dramatically ended two decades 
ago, today it is where history has most dramatically returned.” According to Kagan, 
beyond Russia’s actions there was a mood of recrimination reminiscent of Germany 
after World War I and a corresponding will to regain the global power it has lost at the 
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end  of  Cold  War  (ibid., 16-17). The author did not find it hard to imagine a serious 
confrontation between the East and the West and was already thinking about 
consequences: 
What  would  Europe  and  the  United  States  do  if  Russia  played  hardball  in  either  Ukraine  or  
Georgia? They might well do nothing … Nevertheless, a Russian confrontation with Ukraine or 
Georgia would usher a brand new world – or rather a very old world (ibid., 24). 
The color revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia were another common rallying point for 
neoconservatives and more hawkish liberals. Because of the extensive U.S. support to 
Georgia under George W. Bush, influential neoconservatives had close ties to the 
Georgian  leadership.  Randy  Scheunemann,  a  foreign  policy  adviser  to  John  McCain’s  
presidential campaign, had worked as a lobbyist for the Georgian government, and 
McCain himself was considered a personal friend of President Saakashvili (Asmus 
2010, 2009-209). 
In the light of the long-held suspicions about Moscow’s tsarist ambitions, more recent 
promotion  of  the  freedom  agenda,  close  personal  ties  go  Georgia,  and  a  recent  
prediction  by  one  of  the  most  influential  neoconservatives  that  the  “return  of  history”  
would largely play out in the Caucasus, it is no wonder that the neoconservatives were 
particularly well prepared for the political debate that followed the Russia-Georgia war. 
For them, the outbreak of hostilities in the Caucasus not only proved right the 
proponents of the NATO enlargement and a strong Western deterrence against Russia, 
but also demonstrated the cost of the failure of the U.S. leadership and credibility. 
From a more political point of view, the Russia-Georgia war seemed to have provided 
the neoconservatives a chance to regain some of the influence they had lost after Iraq. 
Was not this exactly the kind of nightmare scenario that Kagan and others had been 
warning about? Among the various competing explanations for the events in Georgia, 
the neconservative narrative thus possessed a solid ideological foundation, political 
urgency and a rhetorical efficiency that few alternative explanations could match. 
Neither were McCain, the Kagans, Kristol, Donnelly, Charles Krauthammer, Max Boot 
and  others  afraid  to  raise  the  stakes:  this  was  not  about  a  minor  regional  conflict  
somewhere far away, but about the direction of the U.S foreign policy. 
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 4 The Narrators 
The following chapter focuses on the actors presenting the threat texts. It is argued that 
the difference between the stories about the Russia-Georgia war can be partly attributed 
to the different backgrounds and specializations of the narrators. For example, one can 
discern a “specialist narrative” on the crisis that was also recognized by other actors. 
While it is not within the boundaries of the present thesis to identify and analyze all 
possible narratives on the Russia-Georgia war, even demonstrating that there were 
disagreements on several key issues reveals the possibility for alternative explanations. 
This observation also nurtures a healthy suspicion toward interpretations that are 
presented as inclusive and self-evident. 
Drawing on Stritzel’s framework, the discussion that followed the war is analyzed in 
terms  of  positional  power  of  the  actors.  Most  importantly,  it  is  maintained  that  the  
debate cannot be understood without considering the role of the neoconservatives. As 
the history of the movement was presented in the introduction, the following chapter 
discusses the positional power of the neoconservatives in 2008. The focus on actors 
sheds light on the logic of exclusion and inclusion in the process of narrative formation. 
Asking how the neoconservatives dealt with the alternative explanations helps reveal 
the drawing of boundaries around some explanations and the marginalization of others. 
 4.1 Whose Texts? 
Students of speech act and performativity tend to agree that, in addition to analyzing the 
threat  texts  and  their  discursive  context,  attention  must  also  be  paid  to  the  actors  who 
present the text. After all, “whose security?” is one of the central questions in the critical 
security studies (cf. Walker 1997). In Stritzel’s framework as well, securitization is 
observed in terms of the positional power of actors who influence the process of 
defining meaning. 
According to McDonald (2008, 564) the important question of how particular actors are 
empowered or marginalized is under-theorized in the securitization framework. 
Stritzel’s interest in the positional power of the actors involved is therefore a promising 
opening. Unfortunately, Stritzel’s definition of power is rather limited, which the author 
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himself readily admits. According to Stritzel (2007, 372), power can be understood as 
positional to the extent that relevant actors are placed in “different positions within a 
given social environment to influence collective meaning constructions”. The 
mechanics  of  this  process  are  largely  left  unexplained:  citing  again  the  example  of  
organized crime in the USA, Stritzel demonstrates with one paragraph how the Federal 
Bureau of Narcotics (FBN) was able to shape the public perceptions behind the scenes. 
For Stritzel, power is all about context: the existing discourse privileges or 
disadvantages certain actors and texts as opposed to others (ibid., 370-373). Like the 
Copenhagen School in general, this dimension of Stritzel’s framework is also vulnerable 
to McDonald’s (2008, 564) criticism of focusing too much on the speech of dominant 
actors at the expense of neglecting more marginal utterances. 
The participants in the foreign policy discussion following the Russia-Georgia war were 
aware of both the existence of various explanations for the crisis and the 
competitiveness of the discursive environment. This is reflected in the criticism by both 
liberal and conservative commentators that the media were not presenting the situation 
objectively. Particularly at the AEI seminar, speakers were worried about the way 
Russia was seen to be winning the “media war”. It was assumed that Moscow had a 
consistent message – that Russia was only defending itself from Georgia’s aggression 
and, as a side product, demonstrating its military strength against a well-armed U.S. 
proxy (Peters 2008, F. Kagan 2008). According to the conservative analysts, the Western 
media proved that they were not up to their roles as watchdogs. Many commentators 
also reminded that Putin’s Russia had inherited “the massive apparatus and the 
techniques and talents of propaganda from the old Soviet Union (e.g. Peters 2008). 
It is evident that the White House recognized the prolification of the threat texts about 
the conflict as well and explicitly tried to seize the narrative. A senior official quoted by 
Asmus (2010, 152) states that the administration attempted to “change the narrative and 
terms of reference for the conflicts and for Georgia more generally”. Nevertheless, even 
conservative political analysts considered the White House’s response lame (Peters 
2008), and an editorial in The Wall Street Journal on 13 August 2008 accused the U.S. 
officials  of  “playing  into  Vladimir  Putin’s  hands”.  Seizing  the  narrative  was  not  made  
easier for the administration by the fact that president Bush was abroad and the 
Congress at recess. Consequently, the role of various experts and specialists was 
perhaps even more important than usually in shaping the public discourse on the Russia-
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Georgia war. 
The stated function of the seminars at Brookings and AEI was to bring together the best 
possible experts to discuss the situation in Georgia. At Brookings, Daniel Benjamin 
introduced “a remarkable group of analysts”, adding that if they had not been familiar to 
the audience before August 8th they certainly were now. At the AEI, moderator Thomas 
Donnelly  led  off  the  event  by  stating  that  “[t]his  is  going  to  be,  I  would  say,  a  really,  
first-rate, situational assessment”. The AEI panelists’ expertise leaned heavily on the 
military side: besides two officers or retired officers of the U.S. Army, Frederick Kagan 
was presented as “a Russian scholar and a student of Russian military affairs” (Donnelly 
2008). The fourth speaker, AEI resident scholar Leon Aron, was asked to “talk about the 
angle from Moscow” (ibid.). At the Brookings seminar, the panelists’ background was 
more political: for example Martha Brill Olcott was introduced as a specialist on the 
problems of transitions in Central Asia and Caucasus as well as the security challenges 
in the Caspian (Benjamin 2008). 
Examining the discussion in the media and at the think tanks during and after the 
conflict, it is possible to discern elements of a particular type of specialist discourse. For 
example, at the Brookings event, Olcott was underlining the importance of her personal 
experiences from the Caucasus: 
[Y]ou just have no idea of the proximity unless you’ve been there. If you want a hamburger, it’s 
nothing to drive to Ingushetia or Checnya to Vladikavkaz, the capital of Northern Ossetia. 
In the same vein, Michael Dobbs noted in The Washington Post on 17 August 2008 that 
Unlike most of the armchair generals now posing as experts on the Caucasus, I have actually 
visited Tskhinvali, a sleepy provincial town in the shadow of the mountains that rise along 
Russia’s southern border. 
Remarkably, one of the central arguments of both these experts who professed to know 
the region is that the reasons for and consequences of the Russia-Georgia war are more 
complicated than most analysts are willing to admit. Dobbs points out that, before the 
crisis, the Ossetians viewed Georgians in much the same way that Georgians view 
Russians and argues that “[w]hen it comes to apportioning blame for the latest flare-up 
in the Caucasus, there’s plenty to go around”. Olcott even suggests that perhaps there 
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should not be a grand narrative at all: the crisis may result from partly unintentional 
actions and everything that happens on the ground is not necessary orchestrated by 
Moscow. 
Despite – or perhaps because of – this special knowledge, it appears that the experts of 
the Caucasus region were regarded rather suspiciously in the public discourse. A quote 
from Glenn Beck, a popular conservative TV host at CNN, is descriptive: 
Then you got the experts on TV. And the newspapers and they’re lining up to show you fancy 
maps and talk about how this is all a battle for control over some breakaway republic that none 
of us have probably ever heard of before. I think, that’s just a distraction from what this is really 
all about, energy, oil, power (Glenn Beck, CNN, 11 August 2008). 
An implicit juxtaposition between the “expert knowledge” about the intricate historical 
and political developments behind the crisis on the one hand, and the big picture on 
“what this is really all about” on the other, is also present in Frederick Kagan’s – 
himself an expert on Russia – comments at the AEI event that the Russia-Georgia war 
“is not an irrelevant, trivial local conflict that’s too hard to understand”. In an interesting 
rhetorical move at Brookings, Robert Kagan – who disagrees with Martha Brill Olcott  
at several points of the discussion – even distances himself from this kind of expert 
status by stating in his opening remarks that “since I don’t know an eight or an eight-
hundredth of what Martha knows about these issues, I’m going to talk briefly about 
Europe”. 
 4.2 Neoconservatives in 2008 
The seminars organized by the AEI and the Brookings were marked by a strong 
presence of people who can be described neoconservative thinkers. The Brookings 
event featured Robert Kagan, according to Justin Vaïsse (2010, 276) “arguably the most 
influential neocon intellectual”. Author of many critically praised books and a monthly 
columnist for The Washington Post,  Kagan  was  also  the  co-founder  of  The Weekly 
Standard and the Project for New American Century (PNAC), an organization 
committed to advancing neoconservative principles. Appropriately, both The Weekly 
Standard and the PNAC shared the building with the American Enterprise Institute, 
which is regarded as the leading neoconservative think tank (Schifferes 2003, Heilbrunn 
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2004, 107). This institutional bias is represented in the fact that two of the panelists of 
the AEI seminar on 13 August, Frederick Kagan (Robert’s brother) and Thomas (Tom) 
Donnelly are mentioned in Vaïsse’s index of the principal figures of the “third age of 
neoconservatism” (2010, 286-287). 
Furthermore, neoconservative voices were all over the media during and after the crisis 
in the Caucasus. Traditionally, neoconservatism has been known for the capacity of its 
dynamic intellectual network to influence the public debate. In addition to magazines 
such as The Weekly Standard, The Commentary and The New Republic, neoconservative 
views prevailed in the editorial pages of The Wall Street Journal and, thanks to columns 
by Robert Kagan, Charles Krauthammer, David Brooks and Max Boot, had visibility 
also in The Washington Post, The New York Times and The Los Angeles Times. On 
television, many political analysts of the Fox News had neoconservative sympathies 
(Vaïsse 2010; 231, 267-290). 
It is commonly asserted that the neoconservatives held close ties to President George W. 
Bush. However, unimpressed by the realist foreign policy of George H.W. Bush, the 
neoconservatives did not at first openly embrace his son who was mainly campaigning 
on domestic issues. In the 2000 campaign, The Weekly Standard ended up endorsing 
John McCain, a long-time neoconservative favorite. Nevertheless, after 9/11 and the 
start of the global war on terror, no one remembered Pat Buchanan and the isolationist 
aspirations within the Republican party. The neoconservative creed of activist foreign 
policy provided President Bush the philosophical foundation for the war in Iraq and 
became undistinguished from the administration’s freedom agenda. 
Even after the unpopular Iraq war that was largely considered to be their doing (cf. 
Heilbrunn 2004, 126),14 the neoconservatives still held considerable sway in the second 
Bush administration. Many of them were recruited from the American Enterprise 
Institute: Vaïsse quotes Bush’s speech at the AEI on 2003 where the President jokes that 
“[y]ou do such good work that my administration has borrowed 20 [some of the finest 
minds in our nation].” Consequently, several critics equaled the “Bush Revolution” with 
a neoconservative coup that was aimed at transforming the U.S. foreign policy (Daalder 
and Lindsay 2004, 15). In 2004, Craig Eisendrath and Melvin Goodman (2004, 64) 
                                               
14 On the other hand, Vaïsse (2010, 242) points out that before the Iraq war, “genuine” neoconservatives 
were included but in lower-ranking positions within the administration. 
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wrote about the “neoconservatives who run the Defense Department”. In 2003, Vice 
President Dick Cheney ordered 30 copies of The Weekly Standard to be delivered to the 
White House each week (Vaïsse 2010, 227). 
There has been much debate on the extent to which George W. Bush was a 
neoconservative himself. Jacob Heilbrunn (2004, 126) maintains that it was not “too 
much to say that Bush is a neoconservative” and not just “a passive conduit for a 
neoconservative cabal”, but Justin Vaïsse (2010, 3) considers it misleading to label Bush 
a neoconservative. And while Craig R. Eisendrath and Melvin A. Goodman (2004, 169) 
present neoconservatives as “the key members of the Bush team”, according to Vaïsse 
(2010, 14) that was not the case with Bush’s inner circle, even though Dick Cheney and 
Donald Rumsfeld often held neoconservative views.15 
During the early years of 2000, when it was already clear that things were getting rough 
in Iraq, “neocon” seemed to have become almost an insult that was hurled at all those 
who supported the war. Especially to some leftist commentators, anyone who spoke for 
the Iraq war was a neocon (Gigot 2004). Other motives behind the use of the politically 
charged designation were related to the infighting within the Republican party, where 
the three-time presidential candidate Buchanan and other advocates for a more 
isolationist approach to the U.S. foreign policy attacked neoconservatives from the right 
(Boot 2002). It is thus not surprising that not all those who were called necons in 2008 
were willing to pick up the nametag. 
Underlying motives aside, an outside observer in 2008 could easily have been led to 
believe that the neoconservatives were omnipresent, occupying all the levels of 
administration, media and political parties. However, it is easy to exaggerate the 
neoconservatives’ importance during the early years of the 21th century. Vaïsse (2010b) 
points out that the movement is limited to a few dozen active people in Washington 
D.C. and New York City and continues (2010, 4) that 
[N]eoconservatism has no electoral, economic, or religious base; it has never had an uncontested 
leader; and it has never been represented by any clearly defined organization. 
                                               
15 Both the critics and defenders of the Bush team agree that the leading neoconservative inside the 
administration was Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense from 2001 to 2005, President of the 
World Bank from 2005 to 2007 and a visiting scholar at the AEI during the crisis in Georgia (cf. 
Daalder and Lindsay 2004, 15; Eisendrath and Goodman 2004, 64; Vaïsse 2010, 242). 
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Furthermore, it can be argued that the political influence of the neoconservatives was 
dwindling in 2008. Vaïsse (2010, 258) notes that although President Bush’s rhetoric 
became increasingly neoconservative in his second term, his policies moved toward 
realism and away from the freedom agenda. This might explain the observation made in 
chapter 3.2 about a somewhat pessimistic and fatalistic undertone in the 
neoconservative narrative at the AEI seminar. Nevertheless, “a small group of 
neoconservatives continued to hang on” (ibid.),  ready to make allies where they could 
find them. While the war in Iraq reaped havoc also among their own lines16, it brought 
neoconservatives closer to “liberal hawks”. As William Kristol defiantly stated in a New 
York Times interview that when it came to Iraq, “[i]f we have to make common cause 
with the more hawkish liberals and fight the conservatives, that is fine with me”. As 
regards the Russia-Georgia war, this was clearly the case, with the exception of there 
being no conservatives to fight against. Citing his father Irving, Kristol even joked that 
since a neoconservative was already defined “a liberal who has been mugged by 
reality”,  they  might  yet  end  up  as  neoliberals,  or  “neoconservatives  who  had  been  
mugged by reality in Iraq” (Kirkpatrick 2004). 
 4.3 Looking for Alternative Explanations 
The securitization framework has been criticized for neglecting the question of how 
particular actors are empowered or marginalized in speech act situations. For example 
McDonald (2008) finds it important to ask to what extent there are alternative 
articulations on security, and how such voices have been silenced or delegitimized. 
Instead of trying to address these questions himself, McDonald simply concludes that 
the framework is “narrow in ways that are both analytically and normatively 
problematic” (2008, 568). Here too a focus on the formation of narratives might bring 
new perspectives to the discussion. 
Besides neoconservative interpretations, there were also other texts circulating on the 
Russia-Georgia war, presented by other actors. While it is not possible to give a 
comprehensive account on all the presented threat texts within the limits of this thesis, 
following Campbell, Der Derian and McDonald it should at least be inquired whether 
                                               
16 Francis Fukuyama was one of the most influential thinkers with neoconservative sympathies to break 
with the Iraq war in 2004 and ultimately with neoconservatism (Vaïsse 2010, 258). 
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alternative narratives might have formed around them. According to Browning (2008, 
14),  multiple  narratives  are  always  in  play,  gaining  resonance  in  different  ways  at  
different  times.  This  is  also  how both  contemporary  analysts  (e.  g.  Beck  2008,  Dobbs  
2008), and later researchers (Asmus 2010) described the situation after the outbreak of 
the August war: everybody had an opinion on the events in the Caucasus, and most were 
willing to present it. 
Having identified a neoconservative narrative, one way to search for alternative 
explanations is to find out how the neoconservatives themselves viewed the situation. 
This intertextual exercise is supported by Browning (2008; 11, 49), who stresses that an 
explicit concern with self-constitution through differentiating the self from others is 
fundamental to any narrative:  
In a complex and changing world it is only through emplotting ourselves in constitutive stories 
differentiating the self from others that we are able to attribute meaning to the social world and 
to construct a sense of our own identity and interests. 
At the same time, however, one must of course exercise caution in treating the 
neoconservative narrative itself as a homogenous story with a distinct message and 
causal connections. There are clear differences between for example Robert Kagan’s 
presentation at the Brookings seminar and the more militant arguments of his colleagues 
at the AEI, not to mention the “liberal hawks” like Ron Asmus who agreed with the 
neoconservatives on some issues but disagreed on others. 
In the think tank presentations and newspaper articles by neoconservative thinkers there 
are several references to other threat texts or narratives on the Russia-Georgia war. They 
do not paint too nuanced a picture: most often the other argument is simply seen to 
maintain that Georgia was to blame for the escalation of the conflict (see for example F. 
Kagan 2008, Peters 2008). In addition, Robert Kagan’s accusation at the Brookings 
seminar on 14 August 2008 that Martha Brill Olcott was defending Moscow’s position 
demonstrates a tendency in the neoconservative threat texts to imply that Russia was 
behind this storyline. Aron (2008) argues that even before the conflict one could discern 
in Russia “very distinct propaganda themes of lost and imperial nostalgia” while Peters 
(2008) points out that, once the conflict started, the Russians “were out very, very 
quickly with their message”. Peters also laments the fact that the Western media 
“bought instantly into Russia’s line that Georgia started this”. 
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Another threat text – imaginary or real – that the neoconservatives seem to have been 
fighting was the notion that the Russia-Georgia war was not a question of vital national 
interest for the United States. At the AEI seminar, Tom Donnelly (2008) pointed out at a 
tendency in the Western press to write Georgia off as a distant and unimportant country. 
A  rather  dramatic  example  of  targeting  such  criticism  was  Ralph  Peters’  preemptive  
argument quoted in chapter 3.1 that the United States was now faced with a “resurgent 
major military power with imperalistic megalomaniacal ambitions”. Senator John 
McCain’s first official statement on the crisis on 11 August 2008 sounded the same 
theme: 
Concerns about what occurs there might seem distant and unrelated to the many other interests 
America has around the world. And yet Russian aggression against Georgia is both a matter of 
urgent moral and strategic importance to the United States of America.  
In several cases, this line of argumentation was backed by historical analogies, 
discussed in more detail in chapter 5.2. 
A related but perhaps even more significant “other” for the neoconservative narrative 
was presented by texts that treated the crisis in Caucasus as a mainly regional conflict 
rooted  in  the  history  of  Georgia,  Russia,  Abkhazia  and  South  Ossetia.17 The 
neoconservative suspicion toward this “specialist narrative” was demonstrated above by 
Glenn Beck’s (2008) derision of experts with “fancy maps” and the pointed exchange 
between Kagan and Olcott at Brookings. In the light of Justin Vaïsse’s reflections on the 
neoconservatives’ intellectual image, this juxtaposition does not appear coincidental nor 
restricted to the discussion on the Russia-Georgia war. Vaïsse points out (2010, 12) that 
while neoconservative thinkers can be considered intellectuals through and through, 
their field of specialization lies mostly in the U.S. history and International Relations. 
According to Vaïsse, not one of them could boast expertise on any region. Even though 
such an argument might be too categorical,18 Vaïsse’s conclusions may offer insights to 
the relationship between the neoconservatives and regional experts: 
                                               
17 Of course, arguments for treating the Russia-Georgia war ultimately as a local conflict and those 
belittling its importance were, at least for their opponents, inherently connected. That this continues to 
be the case is demonstrated by Stelzenmüller (2010), whose essay on the situation in the Caucasus 
begins by stating that the war between Georgia and Russia, “far from having been a minor regional 
conflict in the outermost Eastern backwaters of Europe, was a watershed moment”. 
18 For example, at the AEI seminar on 13 August 2008, Bob Hamilton had just returned from the U.S. 
Embassy in Georgia where he had spent two years as the Chief of the Office of Defense Cooperation. 
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They [neoconservatives] attempted to compensate for this deficit in expertise with ideology, with 
a normative vision of the American role in the world, which at times resulted in simplistic 
arguments and a distorted and highly ethnocentric view of international affairs (ibid.). 
Several neoconservative commentators were ready to argue that if someone did not 
share their view on the Russia-Georgia war, they were “buying into Moscow’s 
argument” or even defending Russia’s positions. 
The neoconservatives may not have been happy with the White House’s diplomatic 
response to the crisis, but in many ways their narrative was supported by statements and 
interviews  given  by  key  officials  in  the  administration.  President  Bush  too  was  
decidedly laying the blame on Russia in his first official statement about the crisis on 11 
August 2008: 
Russia has invaded a sovereign neighboring state and threatens a democratic government elected 
by its people. Such an action is unacceptable in the 21st century … These actions have 
substantially damaged Russia’s standing in the world. And these actions jeopardize Russians’ 
relations – Russia’s relations with the United States and Europe. It is time for Russia to be true to 
its word and to act to end this crisis. 
Nevertheless, in other respects the White House narrative may have worked to 
undermine the neoconservative threat texts. Irrespective of the political reasoning 
behind it, Bush’s decision to step back and let the EU play the lead role in order to avoid 
escalating the conflict was not easily reconciled with the near-apocalyptic situational 
analysis of the panelists at the AEI seminar. At a deeper theoretical level, one can ask 
whether the White House’s strategic decision to highlight the incompatibility of 
Moscow’s “nineteenth century” power politics with the international system of the 21th 
century (Asmus 2010, 178), though seemingly in harmony with the neoconservative 
texts,  was ultimately working against them. After all, as chapter five will discuss in 
more detail, the performative force of the neoconservative threat texts was essentially 
intertwined with the very notions of power politics that the official White House 
statements sought to refute. 
Based on the neoconservative threat texts alone, a search for evidence of the existence 
of other narratives inevitably reveals only a caricature of potential alternative 
explanations. It also completely fails to account for suggestions outside the 
neoconservative realm of possibility. Indeed, Browning (2008, 11) argues that one of the 
functions  of  particular  narratives  is  to  frame the  boundaries  of  what  is  possible  at  any  
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one time. In chapter 5.2 it will be demonstrated that in the source material, by and large 
the only challenges to these boundaries came from audience questions at the AEI and 
Brookings, often in the form of historical analogies. Nevertheless, if one is to follow 
Derrida and Butler, true performative force would lie exactly in breaking with the prior 
context and established narratives. The apparent failure of such texts is turned into a 
condition of their possibility, concealing seeds for something entirely new. However, 
since such radical openings by definition fall outside the mainstream political 
discussion, they are also outside the limits of the source material for the present thesis. 
If one steps out of the neoconservative narrative to reflect the political debate in general, 
it seems safe to argue that at least the “specialist discourse” did not resonate strongly 
with the context. This is based on the small number of threat texts and their apparent 
lack of success in influencing the debate. Yet to many students of World Politics their 
interpretation of the conflict would appear relatively sound, stressing the importance of 
historical, politic and cultural factors and attempting to understand the motives of all 
actors involved. The Tagliavini Report, the most objective available analysis of the 
Russia-Georgia war to date, also supports the arguments presented by experts such as 
Michael Dobbs (2008), Martha Brill Olcott (2008a, 2008b) or James Traub (2008) by 
stating that the short war was only a culminating point of longer developments: 
Indeed, the conflict has deep roots in the history of the region, in peoples’ national traditions and 
aspirations as well as in age-old perceptions or rather misperceptions of each other, which were 
never mended and sometimes exploited (Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the 
Conflict in Georgia 2009, 11). 
How can this lack of resonance thus be accounted for? At least four factors are in play. 
First, following the logic of the securitization theory, the perceived importance of the 
crisis would have served to undermine alternatives for the dominant narrative even 
more than in more normal situations. The previous literature has demonstrated that once 
a question is framed in terms of national security, it has great disciplinary power (Der 
Derian 1995) and works to reproduce the existing hierarchical conditions (Waever 
1995). 
Second, the discursive context favored simplistic arguments and rhetorical bite in the 
presented  texts  at  the  expense  of  deliberative  reasoning.  Of  course,  this  is  a  common  
complaint against mainstream media in general, but in August 2008 even the pundits 
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reflected on the polarized atmosphere of the public debate. At the Brookings seminar, 
Strobe Talbott admitted that “we particularly don’t do nuance very well in Washington 
when we’re a couple months away from a Presidential election”. Such a context was 
obviously tailor-made for virtuosic rhetoricians with a popular touch, such as Robert 
Kagan or William Kristol. 
Third, and on a more speculative note, the Congressional recess might have made it 
even more difficult for individual experts without the backing of the institutional 
machinery to get their voices heard. In the absence of public hearings organized by the 
Senate and House committees, the opportunities for shaping the narrative were limited. 
Even the quietude of summer months could thus have been an advantage for the 
neoconservative network with its renowned capacity to influence the public debate. 
Fourth, a reading inspired by Bourdieu and Stritzel would no doubt assert that most of 
the alternative explanations were not backed by sufficiently powerful actors. A possible 
White House narrative would make an obvious exception but, as has been argued, the 
relationship between the administration and neoconservatives was too complicated to 
allow for a clear differentiation between the threat texts. 
In conclusion, an analysis of the positional power of actors presenting the texts and the 
“resonance” of the existing discourse supports the argument that the neoconservative 
interpretations  of  the  Russia-Georgia  war  were  well  placed  to  influence  the  debate  on  
the Russia-Georgia war, even to the verge of becoming the dominant narrative. 
However, chapters three and four demonstrate that the neoconservatives also faced 
several challenges in respect to both the discursive context and their positional power. It 
does not seem plausible that these two factors alone would explain the prominence that 
the neoconservative narrative indisputably held against alternative explanations. 
Consequently, chapter five will discuss the third and final dimension of Stritzel’s 
framework, the performative force of the presented threat texts.
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 5 Performing the Narrative 
The final dimension of Stritzel’s framework, performative force of the presented threat 
text, focuses on the “structure of a security articulation”. According to Stritzel (2007, 
370), 
[T]he performative force of a threat text can help constitute or change existing discourse 
coalitions and/or change an existing discourse, thereby reconfiguring existing relations of power. 
While the three elements of the framework are thus deeply interconnected, it is the 
notion  of  performative  force  which  is  the  most  concerned  with  the  text  itself.  
Consequently, the tensions between the internalist and externalist theories of 
securitization become apparent. One can also argue that Stritzel’s externalist notion of 
the performative force renders this dimension the most problematic piece of his 
framework. 
Drawing on both sides of the internalist/externalist-divide, this final chapter contributes 
to Stritzel’s argument by examining how the neoconservative narrative gains 
momentum through a citation of an authoritative set of practices and how the narrative 
is structured. The focus is both empirical and theoretical, centering around two practices 
of othering that feature in the source material conspicuously often: the use of historical 
analogies and invoking deterrence. Both are argued to act as shortcuts to rationality, 
thus efficiently adding to the performative force of the threat texts and contributing to 
the formation of the neoconservative narrative. 
 5.1 Defining Performative Force 
Using once more the example of organized crime in a short illustration of the concept of 
performative force, Stritzel argues that a poetical and hermeneutical unearthing of the 
mafia mystique can reveal organized crime as a discursively sedimented and condensed 
threat text (2007, 370-371). Again, the effectiveness of the speech act seems to stem 
from a “resonance” with the context: indeed, here too the onus is clearly more on the 
context than on the text itself. Even taking into consideration the relative shortness of 
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his presentation, Stritzel’s definition of performative force is vague. For example Butler, 
whom Stritzel criticizes for overemphasizing “the constitutive role of language as an 
autonomous power at the expense of the social sphere and its more fundamental 
influences on the very possibility of language” (ibid., 375) gives a much more elaborate 
account on what gives a performative its force. Examining how Bourdieu and Derrida 
read Austin, she concludes that the former focuses on the power of social institutions 
while the latter denies that the force of the text can be derived from conditions outside 
of the language (Butler 1997, 145-149). 
However, despite the disagreement on whether one should focus on the text or context, 
there is also common ground between Stritzel and Butler’s (and thus Bourdieu and 
Derrida’s) understanding of performativity. In the discussion of “resonance” with the 
context (Stritzel) or “echoing” prior actions (Butler) it is implied that there is something 
in the texts themselves that allows them to resonate or echo. Whereas Stritzel writes 
about structured, discursively sedimented and condensed threat texts, Butler describes a 
process where the texts gain an accumulated authoritative force at least partly 
independent of the existing discourse. 
Stritzel’s application of the term “force” is further confused by the fact that he appears 
to use the terms “performative power” and “performative force” almost interchangeably. 
On the other hand, in a figure explaining the interaction between the three dimensions 
of his framework, Stritzel names all three – “performative power”, “power of discourse” 
and “positional power” – “forces” while calling the text, context and actor “layers” 
(2007, 371). Since the separation between “force” and “power” is a basic step in classic 
treatises of power such as Arendt (1969, 43) or Foucault (Alhanen 2007, 119), the 
creative use of terms should perhaps be justified. 
An interest in how the texts achieve self-constitution through othering is central to both 
the externalist and internalist approaches to securitization. From a constructivist 
perspective, Browning (2008, 41) notes that 
[T]he language utilised in discourse is not passive, but active, because it conveys meaning and 
representations that do not simply reflect social reality, but construct and constitute it. 
Remembering Browning’s argument that differentiating the self from others is 
fundamental to all narratives, it should be possible to analyze the performative force of 
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the threat texts based on how efficiently they contribute to this process. Seen in this 
light, “we are all Georgians” is not only a rhetorical device invoking images of 
presidential leadership. As Strobe Talbott sharp-sightedly summarized it at the 
Brookings seminar on 14 August 2008: 
When McCain said it, he was expressing a noble sentiment which we should all endorse which is 
that whatever our differences, Americans and Europeans should come together in recognizing 
who is the victim here and who is the aggressor [emphasis added]. 
One should not need further evidence for the resonance of McCain’s statement than the 
endorsement of a staunch Obama supporter. 
In several respects, the performative force of the neoconservative narrative thus stems 
from a stark differentiation between the friends and the enemies. Having listed a number 
of neoconservative successes, Ehrman (1995, 190) points out that 
If there has been a neoconservative failure, it has been one of overzealousness. Neoconservatives 
have not infrequently viewed their enemies as embodiments of evil who must be destroyed, 
rather than as opponents to be debated or persuaded.19 
In addition to positioning the narrative against potential alternative explanations 
discussed in the previous chapter, the neoconservative texts following the Russia-
Georgia  war  contain  an  abundance  of  enemies.  The  main  attention  is  turned  to  Russia  
and, more accurately, Vladimir Putin: 
The Russians, on whom I have wasted far too much of my life, are drink-sodden barbarians who 
occasionally puke up a genius. And we should make no mistake. Vladimir Putin is one such 
genius (Peters 2008). 
The  central  role  of  the  representations  of  the  other  is  also  supported  by  Jervis  (1976,  
319) who attributes the tendency in international relations to see the behavior of others 
as more planned and coordinated than it is to a “drive to squeeze complex and unrelated 
events into a coherent pattern”. However, especially at the AEI seminar the panelists 
had tough words also for the Europeans – Western Europe was described as a vassal for 
Russian gas exports (Peters 2008) and the French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s attempts 
at mediation as acting for the Russians (F. Kagan 2008) – as well as for the Georgians: 
                                               
19 Interestingly, at the AEI seminar Ralph Peters, perhaps the most zealous critic of Moscow’s actions, 
characterizes his own response as “uncharacteristically” emotional (2008). 
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Peters casts President Saakashvili as an “Iraqi on methamphetamines”. 
While the focus on the othering practices of the threat texts may complement Stritzel’s 
somewhat meager analysis on their performative force, embracing too deeply the 
Schmittian notion of always looking for the other risks to burn the bridge across the 
divide between the externalist and internalist perspectives. Of course, postmodern 
writers have also stressed that meaning and identity are “always the consequence of a 
relationship between the self and the other that emerges through the imposition of an 
interpretation” (Campbell 1998, 23). However, as has been demonstrated above, the 
internalist  conceptions of power and force are more cautious and skeptical.  For Butler,  
the “success” of a performative is achieved through a repetition of authoritative set of 
practices; for Ashley, narratives control the proliferation of meaning by imposing a 
standpoint of interpretation. The performative force of a threat text is thus essentially 
connected to the dominant and oppressive aspects of a narrative, resulting to a 
marginalization of alternative explanations. An interest in the performative force 
inevitably  raises  the  question  about  the  discursive  purpose  of  the  narrative  as  well  as  
about the rhetorical, social and political functions it serves. 
Nevertheless, following Butler it should also be noted that the texts never only reflect 
prior conditions but contain a possibility for adaptation, improvisation and new 
openings. For Derrida, the possibility of a performative lies in its failure instead of 
success, and the importance of alternative explanations stems from their potential to 
break with the existing discourse. Consequently, the internalist and externalist 
perspectives to securitization seem to end up in nearly opposing notions of performative 
force. In addition to Derrida and Butler, the internalist argument could be eloquently 
paraphrased by quoting an author from a completely different context: 
It is in the nature of beginning that something new is started which cannot be expected from 
whatever may have happened before. This character of startling unexpectedness is inherent in all 
beginnings and in all origins … The new always happens against the overwhelming odds of 
statistical laws and their probability, which for all practical, everyday purposes amounts to 
certainty; the new therefore always appears in the guise of a miracle. The fact that man is capable 
of action means that the unexpected can be expected from him, that he is able to perform what is 
infinitely improbable (Arendt 1998, 177-178). 
A deeper analysis of the performative force of the threat texts thus not only supports 
Stritzel’s speculation that it might not be possible to reconcile the internalist and 
externalist perspectives on securitization but suggests that the tension is visible also in 
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the framework that Stritzel himself proposes. 
 5.2 The Use of Historical Analogies 
An interesting feature of the threat texts that stands out in the source material 
concerning the discussion following the Russia-Georgia war is the extensive use of 
historical  analogies.  Points  of  reference  for  the  situation  in  the  Caucasus  were  looked  
for in Finland 1939 (Brzezinski 2008), Hungary 1956 (Peters 2008, Talbott 2008), 
Czechoslovakia 1968 (Fried 2008, Talbott 2008), Berlin 1948 (The Wall Street Journal, 
13 August 2008), Israel 1973 (Boot 2008), Afghanistan 1979 (Talbott), Iraq 1991 
(Peters 2008) and in South Ossetia 2004 (Welt 2008). 21th-century Russia was equaled 
with the Soviet Union and Vladimir Putin with czars (F. Kagan 2008). 
The most common analogy, however, seems to be the 1930s that also inspired many 
different interpretations (see also Sattler, Satyanath and Tucker 2009, 1). Max Boot and 
Zbigniew Brzezinski saw in the Caucasus the same failure to defend small states that 
eventually contributed to the World War II. Robert Kagan (2008b) observed 
resemblances between the revanchist Russia and Germany after the World War I. In one 
of the most dramatic analogies, Brzezinski compared Putin to Hitler (Gardel 2008). 
While Boot admits that the “Nazi analogy may appear overwrought” and stresses – a 
day after Brzezinski’s comments – that no one is claiming that Putin is another Hitler, 
he himself sees echoes of the 1930s in Moscow’s accusations of Saakashvili committing 
war crimes against humanity: “Those were the excuses that Hitler used to swallow 
Czechoslovakia and Poland”. Furthermore, to Boot’s eyes Putin had “more than a 
passing resemblance to lesser autocrats such as Mussolini and the Japanese generals of 
the 1930s”. 
It is evident that the historical analogies play an important role in the attempts to define 
the conflict and have obvious implications on how it is interpreted. Discussing how 
decision-makers learn from history, Robert Jervis (1976, 218-220) argues that such 
analogies both precede the analysis and shape later perceptions. According to Jervis, 
using  past  events  as  an  analogy  for  a  contemporary  one  provides  a  useful  shortcut  to  
rationality but also obscures aspects of the present situation that are different from the 
past one. 
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Because of this “useful shortcut to rationality”, it can also be assumed that historical 
analogies are efficient performatives, and that to frame a conflict in terms of a historical 
situation is to perform a powerful speech act. Drawing on Butler (1997, 51), it is easy to 
see how a historical analogy can help a discourse gain “the authority to bring about 
what it names through citing the linguistic conventions of authority, conventions that are 
themselves legacies of citation”. On the other hand, historical analogies can also be used 
to break with the existing discourse in line with the Derridarian notion of performativity. 
Though Stritzel does not explain in detail what he means by the “structure of a security 
articulation” or “discursively sedimented and condensed threat texts”, the importance of 
historical analogies also to the externalist understanding of securitization is supported 
by his observation (2007, 375) that texts are “always interwoven with relational 
dynamics of power and meaning, rarely the work of any one person and often even 
‘historically intertextual’ in the sense that they transform/translate past meaning 
structures into the present.” 
Furthermore, historical analogies work as powerful building material for narratives, 
situating new events in a familiar context. According to Browning (2008, 46), 
By establishing a linear story from whom we were in the past up until the present a narrative 
framework is created within which experiences become intelligible to ourselves and to others 
and future action becomes meaningful. 
Because of the established wisdom of seeing the 1930s in terms of a failed Western 
deterrence, invoking images that equal Putin with Hitler and Georgia with the countries 
in  the  Central  and  Eastern  Europe  involves  policy  recommendations  that  are  different  
from those stemming from an interpretation of the crisis in the Caucasus as analogous to 
Budapest 1956 or Prague 1968. On the other hand, comparing Georgia’s actions in 
South Ossetia to Russia in Chechnya leads to a completely different mindset and policy 
recommendations that were presented in the media and at the seminars. If a certain 
historical analogy is accepted as a plausibly accurate image of the situation and repeated 
in the circulating threat texts, this will arguably add to their perfomative force. 
The simultaneous occurrence of a variety of neoconservative threat texts and the 
abundance of historical analogies is interesting and probably not coincidental. Vaïsse 
(2010, 269) takes notice of the neoconservatives’ fondness of drawing “lessons” from 
history, concluding that the school of thought places a high value on historical 
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precedents and pointing out that the neoconservatives had developed a rich 
historiography already at the end of the Cold War. Significantly, Vaïsse mentions the 
1930s as an important neoconservative lesson: Churchill had been right and the 
appeasers wrong. According to Vaïsse, other such lessons include Reagan’s victory in 
the Cold War and the conflicts in Bosnia, Kosovo, even Iraq. 
Following the outbreak of the Russia-Georgia war, even contemporary commentators 
paid attention to the myriad of circulating historical analogies. An audience question at 
the AEI seminar on 13 August (Asoyan 2008) noted that “[a] lot of parallels have been 
drawn with the Georgia and the invasion of Russia and occupying South Ossetia 
including Czechoslovakia, Afghanistan et cetera.” Rosa Brooks of The Los Angeles 
Times connects many of these analogies specifically to the neoconservatives: 
“Carpe diem!” cried the neocons. So we demanded that the Russians withdraw from Georgia and 
giddily turned up the rhetorical volume (neocon pundits likened Russia’s action to the 1939 and 
1968 invasions of Czechoslovakia by, respectively, the Nazis and the Soviets) (Brooks 2008b). 
Neoconservative calls to heed the lessons of history abound both in the press and at the 
think tank seminars. In several cases, the historical analogy is followed by appropriate 
policy recommendations. As can be expected, concrete policy proposals are especially 
common in newspaper editorials and op-eds. An instructive example is presented by 
Max Boot in The Los Angeles Times on 12 August 2008: 
The world failed in the 1930s to rally to the defense of small states such as Ethiopia, Poland, 
Czechoslovakia and Finland when they were menaced by larger predators. The statesman of the 
time calculated that the cost of action was too high. What we learned in retrospect was that the 
cost of inaction was far higher. That is a lesson we should heed today.  
In the same article, Boot also compares the situation in Georgia to the Yom Kippur war 
to suggest that the United States could send equipment to Georgia just like it did to 
Israel when it was on the verge of losing. A day later, The Wall Street Journal editorial 
on 13 August 2008 proposed a “Tbilisi airlift” inspired by the events in Berlin in 1948. 
The lessons learned from history often seem to have a moralistic undertone. To 
Zbigniew Brzezinski (2008), Georgia was “the Finland [in 1939] of today, both morally 
and strategically”. Particularly in the statements by the representatives of the 
administration, the moral was directed to Russia: according to Assistant Secretary of the 
State Fried, 
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Russia cannot simultaneously behave like the Soviet Union toward its neighbors like this is 1968 
and act as if it is 2008 when it comes to the WTO (Kessler 2008). 
Other analogies were not directly followed by policy recommendations, fulfilling rather 
the function of describing the situation and building up the narrative. These were 
common at the seminars organized by the AEI and Brookings. Interestingly, in several 
cases the historical analogies were used to spice up the most pessimistic interpretations 
of the conflict, not only to paint the picture with darkest possible colors but also to vent 
the frustration about the administration’s inaction20. From a discursive standpoint, the 
former  can  perhaps  be  explained  by  the  need  to  stress  the  urgency  of  the  situation  as  
opposed to other narratives that aimed at playing down the importance of the crisis. The 
same purpose seems to have been served by opposite means in Robert Kagan’s 
argument (2008b) that nobody remembers the precise details of the Sudeten Crisis, 
“because that morally ambiguous dispute is rightly remembered as a minor part of a 
much bigger drama”. 
In addition to presenting lessons learned from history to support their narrative, the 
neoconservatives were also quick to refute “wrong” historical analogies. When a 
speaker from the audience raised the matter of potential similarities between the Kosovo 
on the one hand and South Ossetia and Abkhazia on the other at the Brookings seminar 
on 14 August, a panelist21 argued that “Kosovo was exactly the opposite. 180 degrees 
opposite”. After Martha Brill Olcott intervened to point out that even though Kosovo 
might not be an accurate analogy for the events in the Caucasus, it did indeed change 
the terms of the discussion, Robert Kagan pointedly notes that 
[W]e can’t pretend that there was nothing going on here, other than a dispute over, you know, 
ethnic boundaries and territories. There was much more going on there, which the panel has 
discussed ... it’s [Kosovo] an illegitimate … argument”. 
Similarly, facing a question if the policies of Finland during the Cold War could be 
applicable to Georgia in some kind of a modern-day version of Finlandization, Strobe 
Talbott (of course not a neoconservative himself) professes to be reluctant to delve too 
deeply into the analogy: 
                                               
20 Cf. the references to a “why-die-for-Danzig mentality” by Peters 2008 and Donnelly 2008, as well as 
the speculation by R. Kagan that the situation could resemble a classic tragedy where Putin had made 
up his mind no matter the consequences. 
21 Unidentified in the transcript, likely Robert Kagan based on how the discussion continues.  
60 
 
[I]t is certainly not the time to be engaging in Monday morning quarterbacking about what the 
victim should have done here. We should all be focusing on what Russia has done. 
When another panelist22 took up the issue to speculate about a parallel to the “Finland 
scenario” – a suggestion that can be considered an exact antithesis to the 
neoconservative argument – he too was immediately confronted by Robert Kagan: 
Panelist: Is  there  a  way  to  bring  the  NATO  issue  into  the  equation  in  a  way  that  satisfies  the  
Russians to return to the status quo and to return to negotiations, without fully abdicating the 
hope of NATO membership for Georgia and other states? 
Kagan: I  worry about the precedent that is set there, because then the policy of NATO will be 
that we will offer NATO membership to countries unless they happen to be invaded by someone, 
in which case we will not offer NATO membership to them. 
There is much less examples of a dismissal of the historical analogies presented by the 
neoconservatives. One of the most explicit was presented in a Washington Post op-ed on 
17 August 2008 where Michael Dobbs argued for treating the Russia-Georgia war as a 
regional conflict, contradicting Robert Kagan and John McCain whose analogies he 
quotes as examples: 
Actually, the events of the past week in Georgia have little in common with either Hitler’s 
dismemberment of Czechoslovakia on the eve of World War II or Soviet policies in Eastern 
Europe. They are better understood against the backdrop of the complicated ethnic politics of the 
Caucasus, a part of the world where historical grudges run deep and oppressed can become 
oppressors in the bat of an eye. 
The firm rebuttal of “wrong” historical analogies provides insight for the logic of the 
interaction between the three dimensions of Stritzel’s framework and, consequently, for 
the formation of the neoconservative narrative. A historical analogy accepted by its 
audience adds to the performative force of the narrative, but the analogies are only 
accepted if they are supported by the existing discourse. It appears evident that the 
positional power of the actors presenting the analogies is also a factor to be considered. 
Writing about the texts of foreign policy, Campbell (1998, 23) maintains that “the 
imposition of an interpretation on the ambiguity and contingency of social life always 
results in an other being marginalized”. It is perhaps not a coincidence that, in the think 
tank seminars, many of the “wrong” analogies were presented in questions from the 
audience. 
                                               
22 Unidentified in the transcript, possibly Cory Welt. 
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In the light of a Derridarian and Butlerian notion of performativity, one explanation for 
the interesting phenomenon where some historical analogies are accepted and others 
refused lies precisely in the potential of the “wrong” analogies to undermine the existing 
discourse. Judging from the panelists’ reactions that were discussed in chapter 3.1, the 
most unacceptable analogy was Ella Asoyan’s suggestion to compare Georgia’s actions 
in South Ossetia to those of Russia in Chechnya in 1994. Asoyan states herself that 
accepting this analogy would lead to uncomfortable questions: 
[P]erhaps the failure of the United States to account and hold accountable Saakasvhili and what 
he did in Tskhinvali on the first day perhaps is the consistency of the United States to overlook 
certain details like they did in Chechnya in 1994. 
Although Asoyan’s speech act can be considered “failed” in the sense that it had no 
apparent effect on the discussion, following Derrida and Butler this failure conceals a 
potential  for  performative  force.  If  the  exchange  between  Asoyan  and  Ralph  Peters  is  
explained only in Bourdieuan terms of Asoyan’s suggestion not being backed by 
sufficient social power – as Stritzel’s framework is inclined to – such potential remains 
unnoticed. 
 5.3 Theoretical Presuppositions 
Until now, this thesis has paid little attention to the neoconservative narrative as a 
theoretical construction in the context of World Politics as a discipline. However, as 
Stritzel points out (2005, 371-372), threat texts often evolve out of particular socio-
linguistic contexts, carrying with them “the baggage of a historically evolved practice 
out of which and toward which a particular text was articulated”. In a similar note, 
Jervis (1976) demonstrates how actors with different theoretical presuppositions may 
draw entirely different conclusions from the same event. Building on Stritzel’s 
assumption (2007, 370-371) that “different semantic and/or semiotic threat structures 
generate different performative forces”, the attention is now turned to the theoretical 
underpinnings of the neoconservative narrative. 
A major theoretical conviction that emerges from the neoconservative history lessons is 
the need to maintain a credible U.S. deterrence against potential rivals. This is reflected 
in the importance of the 1930s and the end of Cold War in the neoconservative 
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historiography.23 In their article that laid out the new neoconservative agenda in 1997, 
Robert Kagan and William Kristol summed up the experience of the Cold War: 
During the Cold War, the strategies of deterrence and containment worked so well in checking 
the ambitions of America’s adversaries that many American liberals denied that our adversaries 
had ambitions or even, for that matter, that America had adversaries. 
In the discussion that followed the Russia-Georgia war, a conception of the conflict as a 
result of a failed U.S. deterrence played a key role in the neoconservative narrative. 
Consequently, the notion of deterrence can be applied to explain the neoconservative 
demands on punitive measures against Russia that were touched upon in chapter 3.3. 
Often the calls to wield a stick instead of a carrot were combined with admonitions of 
the dangers of appeasement. For example, Max Boot argued in The Los Angeles Times 
on 12 August 2008 for a hawkish approach to Russia and considered even sending arms 
to Georgia: 
Likewise [as in the 1930s], the Russian attacks on Georgia, if left unchecked, could easily trigger 
more conflict in the future. If the Kremlin won’t comply, the West should respond with sanctions 
such as withdrawing ambassadors from Moscow, kicking Russia out of the Group of 8 leading 
industrialized nations and freezing Russian bank accounts abroad … Sending American troops is 
out of the question, but we can send American equipment … Pictures of long columns of Russian 
vehicles advancing slowly down winding mountain roads indicate that a few well-placed 
missiles could wreak havoc with their operations. 
Indeed, at the Brookings seminar on 14 August 2008, Strobe Talbott noted that the talk 
of punitive measures “resonates with the discourse in this country over how to 
respond”. That the U.S. foreign policy debate following the crisis in Georgia was 
strongly defined by the notion of deterrence is equally supported by the more scholarly 
accounts of the conflict that have already made it through the press. According to 
Asmus (2010, 138), 
After the August war, a debate emerged over whether Russia might have been prevented from 
attacking had the Alliance24 actually  granted  MAP25 in Bucharest. Would MAP have deterred 
Moscow? 
                                               
23 In an extreme but illustrating example, during the 2008 presidential election campaign a conservative 
political commentator accused Barack Obama of being an “appeaser” and compared him to Neville 
Chamberlain. Pressed by the host Chris Matthews, though, the commentator was unable to reiterate 
what Chamberlain had actually done in the 1930s. MSNBC, Hardball with Chris Matthews on 15 
May 2008. 
24 NATO. 
25 Membership Action Plan. 
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In addition to the prevalence of the notion of deterrence in the source material, a further 
examination of the concept is warranted also because of its potential importance for the 
performative force of the neoconservative threat texts under consideration. This 
argument is based on Patrick Morgan’s observation (2003, 67) that “decision makers 
often want to use deterrence to override the complications of a somewhat irrational 
[world]”. As another shortcut to rationality, the concept of deterrence is a powerful tool 
for narrativity. If it is accepted in the discourse that, from a Western standpoint, the 
situation  in  the  Caucasus  was  analogous  to  Central  and  Eastern  Europe  before  the  
outbreak of the World War II, the history lesson of the dramatic consequences of failed 
deterrence are applied and a certain internal logic follows for the narrative. 
One way to approach deterrence as a part of the broader neoconservative narrative is to 
apply Maarten Hajer’s case study on discourse coalitions, practices and meaning in 
environmental politics. Looking for an empirical key to the theoretical discussion, Hajer 
(2005, 297-298) is “struck by the dominant role of acid rain” in the source material: 
It occurred to me that this issue seemed emblematic of the bigger ‘problematic’, or, more 
precisely, for understanding that problematic at the time. Focusing my empirical research on acid 
rain, I could perhaps gain meaningful insights on what was going on in environmental discourse 
[emphasis in the original]. 
Interestingly, Hajer later refers to acid rain as an “element of a narrative on industrial 
society and pollution” (ibid., 299, emphasis added). Following his example, deterrence 
can plausibly be considered as “emblematic” of the bigger problematic, helpful in 
gaining “meaningful insights on what was going on” in the foreign policy discourse that 
followed the Russia-Georgia war and, consequently, an “element” of the 
neoconservative narrative. 
According to Morgan (2003, 1), 
The essence of deterrence is that one party prevents another from doing something the first 
party does not want by threatening to harm the other party seriously if it does. 
The basic assumption of the deterrence theory is that great dangers arise if an aggressor 
believes that the status quo powers are weak in capability or resolve (Jervis 1976, 58). 
On  the  one  hand,  deterrence  has  been  used  both  as  a  tactic  –  “just  a  variant  of  using  
your elbows” (Morgan 2003, 238) – and a strategy of international relations. On the 
other hand, the roots of classical deterrence theory are dated back to Thucydides (e.g. 
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Lebow 2007), and according to Zagare and Kilgour (2000, xix), deterrence should be 
seen as “a universal phenomenon that operates across culture, across technologies, and 
across millennia”. 
One of the objectives and consequences of the balance-of-power system, deterrence 
became the dominant U.S. military strategy during the Cold War (Morgan 2003; 12, 
238-239). The participants in the discussion that followed the Russia-Georgia war were 
thus thoroughly familiar with the concept. In February 2010, “preventing and deterring 
conflict”  was  identified  as  one  of  four  priority  objectives  in  the  Quadrennial Defense 
Review Report (QDR) published by the U.S. Department of Defense. Following the 
publication of the administration’s Nuclear Posture Review, Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton wanted “to make it very clear” that the USA maintains a strong deterrent (Face 
the Nation on 9 April 2010, CBS). 
The classical deterrence theory was developed in the intellectual tradition of realpolitik, 
“when postmodernism was but a gleam in the academic eye” (Morgan 2003, 116). After 
the end of the Cold War it has been targeted by a fierce criticism. Zagare and Kilgour 
(2000, xix) label the theory “logically inconsistent, empirically inaccurate, and 
prescriptively deficient”. Morgan (2003, xv-xvi) notes that after decades’ of speculation 
about deterrence, not much has been learned. Significantly, he also points out that the 
academic research has brought little certainty on what lessons about deterrence one 
should learn from history (ibid., 116-171). 
Irrespective of the ongoing debate on the usefulness of the deterrence theory after the 
Cold War and possibilities to update it to the 21th century (cf. Morgan 2003, Sartori 
2005, Zagare and Kilgour 2000), military strategy has been considered an especially 
fruitful ground for constructivist analysis (Adler 1997; 333, 346). Because of the rich 
historiography of deterrence, strong theoretical presuppositions of the classical 
deterrence theory and its continued centrality in the military doctrine, invoking the 
concept is arguably a potentially powerful speech act that has apparent consequences for 
the formation of the narrative. For example, Morgan has argued (1983, 20) that when 
deterrence comes to play, it involves a relationship between adversaries, has to do with 
conflict and a centers on the use of threats. In alleged deterrence situations, a lot of 
consideration is also given to the capability and credibility of the actors involved 
(Zagare and Kilgour 2000, Morgan 2003). Finally, a focus on deterrence implies strong 
assumptions on actor rationality. These are central traits in the neoconservative threat 
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texts. From an intertextual/deconstructive perspective, the concept of deterrence could 
thus play an important role in analyzing how the hegemonic narrative is constructed and 
how “events or factors that we identify as dangerous come to be ascribed as such only 
through an interpretation of their various dimensions of dangerousness” (Campbell 
1998, 2). 
 5.4 Cold War Rhetoric and Power Politics 
The final point of analysis focuses on the tendency of the neoconservative narrative to 
depict the Russia-Georgia war as not only analogous to but possibly even a return of the 
Cold War. Such arguments seemed to suggest that it was time for the political 
community to wake up from the post-Cold War illusions of perpetual peace: 
For anyone who thought that stark international aggression was a thing of the past, the last week 
must have come as a startling wake-up call (McCain 2008). 
The end of the Cold War was supposed to usher in a new age in which the major powers would 
no longer dictate to their neighbors how to run their affairs. That is why Russia’s invasion of 
Georgia is so tragic and so potentially ominous (Brzezinski 2008). 
At the AEI seminar on 13 August 2008, Leon Aron lamented that “we now are forced 
much, certainly to my chagrin, to resort to the Cold War criminological26 language”. 
This discursive move was significant enough to be noticed in the press and the foreign 
policy community. Katrina Vanden Heuvel argued in The Nation on 13 August 2008 that 
commentary in the mainstream media had “turned a longstanding, complex separatist 
conflict into a casus belli for a new cold war with Russia”, while Eric Alterman and 
George Zornick (2008) commented on the return of “Cold War punditocracy” in the 
U.S. media that contributed to oversimplification of the conflict. According to Johannes 
Linn (2008), “perhaps the most serious question is whether the Georgia-Russian war of 
2008 will mark a definitive reversal toward cold war-style antagonism”. Dmitri Trenin 
wrote gloomily on 9 August 2008 that  
So far, each step in the Caucasus drama has put the conflict on a yet higher plane. The next step 
will no longer be just about the Caucasus, or even Europe. Remember the Guns of August. 
                                               
26 Should probably read “kremlinological”. 
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For Trenin, this was a script written by President Mikheil Saakashvili. On the other 
hand, Rosa Brooks (2008b) directly pointed at the neoconsevatives as the source of the 
Cold War rhetoric in The Los Angeles Times: 
Among neocons and assorted righties, Cold War nostalgia has been widespread lately. And no 
wonder: Just compare the Cold War with the Global War on Terror. “Cold War” had a real ring to 
it.  But  “Global  War  on  Terror”?  Clumsy,  and  what  a  crummy  acronym  –  GWOT.  Thanks  to  
events in Georgia, we can put the tedium of the GWOT behind us and return to the Cold War. 
In the light of the observations of this thesis about the formation of the neoconservative 
narrative,  this  resort  to  Cold  War  analogies  is  not  surprising.  Drawing  on  both  an  
established historiography and theoretical convictions centering on the concept of 
deterrence, it is entangled to Robert Kagan’s argument about the return of history and 
the “end of dreams”. When Kagan writes that the Russia-Georgia war marked the 
official return of history, it is obviously not about any kind of history but indeed “an 
almost 19th-century style of great-power competition” (2008b). 
Perhaps the most significant consequence of the “Cold War rhetoric” is that it 
contributes to an understanding of the Russia-Georgia war not as a local or regional 
conflict rooted in complex ethnic, political and historical dynamics but as a greater 
confrontation between the East and the West. This was accompanied by the notion that 
the crucial national interests of the United States were involved in the Caucasus and, 
consequently, the U.S. credibility was on the line (see for example Krauthammer 2008b, 
The Wall Street Journal 13 August 2008). The “Cold War rhetoric” is thus a classic 
example of a securitizing speech act, where security discourse is characterized by 
“dramatizing issue as having absolute priority” and presenting it as an existential threat 
(Wæver 1998). Nevertheless, these sentiments had strong resonance beyond the 
neoconservative circles: in an introduction to the Brookings seminar on 14 August 2008, 
Daniel Benjamin stated that the events had thrown into question some of the most 
fundamental hopes and assumptions about the post-Cold War world. 
The spirit of this argument is illustrated in a piece by Zbigniew Brzezinski in the Time 
Magazine on 14 August 2008: 
Russia’s aggression toward Georgia should not be viewed as an isolated incident. The fact is, 
Putin and his associates in the Kremlin don’t accept the post-Soviet realities. 
The stakes are high. Ultimately, the independence of the post-Soviet states is at risk. 
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The narrative of a confrontation between the two Cold War superpowers makes strong 
but mostly unquestioned assumptions about the motives of the actors involved. Because 
of  the  logic  of  narrativity  that  puts  stress  on  actor  rationality  and  causal  connections,  
this has consequences for how the story continues. For example, when Russia is 
considered unable to ever “sit still inside its own borders” for reasons that have 
“something to do with geography and the imperial legacy and whatnot”, as Leon Aron 
does at the AEI seminar on 13 August, it becomes obvious that “[i]f Russia pays little or 
no price … the next target of opportunity is Ukraine”.27 This  is  of  course  a  familiar  
debate between neoconservatives and their political rivals: in 1998, a collection of 
articles opposing the NATO enlargement that ultimately took place in 2004 by the 
“paleoconservative” Cato Institute accused the proponents of the expansion of a 
“conviction that Russia is inherently and incorrigibly expansionist, regardless of how 
and by whom it is governed” (Harries 1998, 192). 
The neoconservative narrative thus meets the criteria of Campbell’s (op. cit.) 
“relativizing historiography in which things have a self-evident quality that allows them 
to speak for themselves”. The narrative incontestably draws on what Campbell 
describes a “power-politics understanding of world politics” and works to marginalize 
alternative interpretations. It has been argued that this oppositional view of the politics 
of security is built in the securitization framework because of the indebtedness of the 
Copenhagen  School  to  the  political  theory  of  Carl  Schmitt  (Williams  quoted  in  
McDonald 2008, 578). Ultimately this calls into question the potential of even Stritzel’s 
insightful framework for studying the construction of security as it risks neglecting how 
particular threat texts are empowered and other marginalized. This thesis suggests that a 
focus on narrativity can help to pay attention to these processes. 
Despite the sober tone of the foreign policy discussion that followed the Russia-Georgia 
war, there were limits to the applicability of the Cold War analogy. Answering to an 
audience question at the Brookings seminar on the need for more substantial Western 
military presence in the Caucasus region, Strobe Talbott emphasized that “nobody in the 
United States – notably, including our military establishment – wants a new Cold War”. 
According to Talbott, the USA did not have that kind of security relationships in the 
region – which was of course why Georgia was interested in the NATO membership in 
                                               
27  Aron continued to pursue this argument in an op-ed titled ‘Russia’s Next Target Could Be Ukraine’ in 
The Wall Street Journal on 10 September 2008. 
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the first place. In a monologue that followed, Talbott analyzed the differences between 
the Russia-Georgia war and the Cold War: 
I do not think it is accurate or useful to see this in terms of a new Cold War. The Cold War had 
very specific characteristics. It was a global, geopolitical, ideological contest or struggle between 
two  armed  camps  …  This  is  a  new  phenomenon  …  [Russia  does  not]  want  to  back  to  an  
autarchic system in which they are squared off against the rest of the world … What they do 
want is to do is join, or rejoin, the world on their terms, and on the basis of their strength … And 
what they are basically saying is, “We’re back. We’re part of the globalized world. You have to 
accept us on our terms”. 
Neither were the policy recommendations based on the neoconservative narrative as 
self-evident as many described them. There continued to be alternative approaches: for 
example, having pointed to the risk of a strengthening Cold War mentality on both 
sides, Johannes Linne (2008) argues that the Western countries should now engage in 
serious discussions with the major emerging powers about sharing global rights and 
responsibilities, improving representation at international institutions and revitalizing 
the United Nations. 
The administration’s tactics of highlighting the anachronism of Russia’s actions and 
referring to power politics as a phenomenon belonging to past centuries worked to limit 
the plausibility of the Cold War rhetoric as well. However, the sarcastic tone of the 
treatment of the neoconservative alarmism in the media suggests that ultimately even 
the neoconservative narrative did not fully resonate with the discursive context. Unlike 
during the Cold War, despite tough proposals of temporary punitive measures the 
neoconservative threat texts themselves were now framed in a way that left no real 
doubt of Russia belonging to the globalized community. This limited the performative 
force of Cold War rhetoric, neoconservative history lessons and invoking the concept of 
deterrence. The discussion thus returns to Stritzel’s framework: when the discursive 
context changes, this has implications on the performative force of a threat text as well 
as on the positional power of the actors. 
Of course, even the neoconservatives did not truly call for the return of the Cold War 
attitudes. Two weeks after the AEI seminar, Frederick Kagan (2008b) stressed in The 
Weekly Standard on 25 August 2008 that the Cold War is not back and that the “Russian 
attacks on Georgia don’t mean American soldiers will soon be staring at Red Army 
soldiers in the middle of Germany or that U.S. defense spending must triple to match a 
global Russian military juggernaut”. However, Kagan argued that the crisis in the 
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Caucasus had been a deliberate assault on Western credibility and presents the United 
States and its allies a clear choice: help Russia’s neighbours protect themselves or 
“serve as midwife to a reborn Russian Empire and an international order that is red in 
tooth and claw”. 
Writing in the same number of The Weekly Standard, Robert Kagan once more referred 
to the Russia-Georgia war as the return of history and a beginning of a new era of 
“growing tensions and sometimes confrontation between the forces of liberal 
democracy and the forces of autocracy”. The focus is no more on the events in the 
Caucasus, but on how the United States should act to maintain its benevolent hegemony 
on the globe. Just as the analogy to the 1930s or the Cold War was used as a powerful 
rhetorical device in the formation of the neoconservative narrative on the Russia-
Georgia war, the stories about the crisis in the Caucasus were only threads in a greater 
tale. The Russia-Georgia war was rapidly transformed into a new neoconservative 
history lesson, a piece of evidence for the larger neoconservative narrative in the 
struggle for the direction of the U.S. foreign policy. 
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 6 Conclusions 
This thesis has argued that, following the Russia-Georgia war in August 2008, a 
neoconservative narrative gained prominence among the various interpretations of the 
conflict. The narrative was characterized by a representation of the crisis as a crucial 
event  in  world  politics,  one  that  pitted  East  against  West  and  where  the  United  States  
had vital national interests at stake. According to the narrative, the Russia-Georgia war 
was emblematic of the return of history in the guise of power politics that  stressed the 
importance of maintaining credibility and effective deterrence. The narrative was 
formed in a process where causal connections were established between individual 
threat texts. Highlighting the potentially grave consequences for the United States of the 
conflict and speculating on the underlying motives of the actors involved resulted in a 
rhetorically convincing but in many respects simplified story. 
Drawing on the securitization framework of Holger Stritzel, this thesis argued that the 
narrative formation can be analyzed in terms of the existing discourse, positional power 
of the actors presenting the threat texts as well as the performative force of the texts. All 
three elements worked to the advantage of the neoconservatives. The narrative was able 
to cite authoritative prior practices through powerful historical analogies and theoretical 
presuppositions. As a result, the discursive context for the discussion about the Russia-
Georgia war was framed against the experiences of the Cold War. 
This thesis maintained that the U.S. foreign policy debate on the importance of the 
Russia-Georgia war cannot be understood without paying attention to neoconservatism. 
Its  continued  prominence  after  the  end  of  the  Cold  War  speaks  of  the  capacity  of  this  
school of thought to undergo transformations and reproduce itself. The neoconservative 
threat texts have not always resonated with the political climate nor have their authors 
always been powerfully positioned. In terms of Stritzel’s framework, however, the 
performative force of the neoconservative threat texts on the Russia-Georgia war is 
significant. Partly as a result of the long tradition as foreign policy intellectuals, 
neoconservatives have been adept at invoking powerful images around which much of 
the U.S. security discourse is structured. 
Chapter four discussed the possibility of alternative explanations for the Russia-Georgia 
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war. It was demonstrated that the neoconservatives guarded the boundaries of the realm 
of possible interpretations of the conflict rather jealously, attempting to marginalize 
dissenting opinions. Using Stritzel’s terminology, the alternative explanations were not 
backed by positional power and did not resonate with the existing discourse. In addition, 
nuanced accounts of a complex regional conflict lacked the performative force of the 
neoconservative threat texts. However, to the extent one can distinguish a separate 
White House narrative, it worked against the neoconservative interpretation by stressing 
that the “power politics” belonged to the past. 
In the end, one can also ask if the muted official U.S. response to the Russia-Georgia 
war must be considered a demonstration of the fact that even the neoconservative 
narrative did not fully resonate with political realities. Since it was shown that the near-
hegemony of the neoconservative interpretation of the crisis in the Caucasus can partly 
be attributed to context-specific factors, such as the merging of the interests between the 
neoconservatives and liberal hawks, the importance of Georgia in the recent 
neoconservative historiography or the polarized discursive context that favored skillful 
rhetoric, it would be interesting to analyze similar debates on other contemporary 
issues. What is the relevance of the neoconservative narrative on Iran’s nuclear 
program, U.S.-China relations or the Middle East peace process? Or more generally: 
what is the ability of the neoconservatives to influence the foreign policy discussion 
under the Obama presidency? As the presidential election of 2012 approaches, it is also 
worth following which candidate, if any, succeeds in winning over the 
neoconservatives.  
As  an  empirical  test  for  Stritzel’s  framework,  this  thesis  shows that  his  reading  of  the  
securitization theory provides a useful tool for further research. The framework helps to 
focus the attention to important issues such as the relationship between the text, the 
context and the actors. The division between internalist and externalist notions of 
securitization is a useful contribution to clarify the securitization debate which has 
drawn on both constructivist and postmodern theories. Considering the briefness of 
Stritzel’s presentation, it is understandable that some of the elements in the framework 
remain vague. 
Nevertheless, this thesis argued that Stritzel does not avoid some of the main problems 
of the securitization framework. His introduction of the term “threat text” to replace the 
“speech act” goes only a few steps toward a consideration of performative utterances as 
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lengthy and complicated processes instead of single events. While Stritzel’s framework 
is useful in analyzing how individual threat texts relate to their context, it neglects the 
process where the accumulation of texts affects the way some become hegemonic and 
others marginalized. 
In the same vein, Stritzel’s framework fails to account for the Butlerian and Derridarian 
notion of performativity which stresses the possibility for renewable action and 
breaking with the prior context. While this may be justified by sticking to the externalist 
theory of securitization, the present thesis has argued that such discussion of speech 
acts, threat texts or narratives remains flawed. The externalists risk focusing too much 
on the formation of hegemonic discourses at the expense of new interpretations. 
Furthermore, it is not even clear if Stritzel himself does not cross the 
internalist/externalist divide, as is illustrated by his difficulty to define the performative 
force. 
Most importantly, this thesis has argued that Stritzel’s framework can be complemented 
through the introduction of the notion of narrativity. By helping to examine the 
genealogy and the internal logic of interpretations that are presented as self-evident, it 
advances the understanding of hegemonic or near-hegemonic discourses but still leaves 
room for alternative explanations. Focusing on the struggle to frame the boundaries of 
possibility, the notion of narrativity not only clarifies the relationship between the text 
and the context but also pays attention to the actors. It has thus plenty to offer for the 
securitization theory as a whole. 
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